| Matter of Connerton v Ryan |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 05845 [86 AD3d 698] |
| July 7, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Robert Connerton, Respondent-Appellant, vMatthew T. Ryan, as Mayor and Commissioner of Public Safety of the City of Binghamton, etal., Appellants-Respondents. |
—[*1] McDonough & Artz, P.C., Binghamton (Philip J. Artz of counsel), forrespondent-appellant.
Egan Jr., J. Cross appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lebous, J.), entered May11, 2010 in Broome County, which, among other things, granted petitioner's application, in aproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul the Hearing Officer's ruling that petitioner borethe burden of proof at a General Municipal Law § 207-a hearing.
Petitioner, a firefighter for respondent City of Binghamton, sustained a work-related injury inDecember 2007, as a result of which he applied for and was granted benefits pursuant to GeneralMunicipal Law § 207-a. In May 2009, petitioner was examined by a physician retained bythe City and thereafter ordered to return to work or risk termination of his benefits. Petitionertimely appealed the City's return to work order, and the City thereafter appointed a HearingOfficer and scheduled an administrative hearing to determine petitioner's continued eligibility forbenefits.[*2]
During a prehearing conference, an issue arose as towhich party would bear the burden of proof, and the Hearing Officer subsequently ruled thatpetitioner, as the party challenging the City's return to work order, would bear the burden ofestablishing that he was not in fact fit to return to work. Petitioner thereafter commenced thisCPLR article 78 proceeding against the City and respondent Matthew T. Ryan, as the City'sMayor and Commissioner of Public Safety, seeking a stay of the underlying hearing andannulment of the Hearing Officer's ruling as to the burden of proof. Respondents answered andraised as an affirmative defense petitioner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.Supreme Court granted the petition and respondents now appeal. Additionally, petitionercross-appeals from so much of Supreme Court's judgment as found that certain procedures orguidelines applied to the underlying administrative proceeding.
We reverse and dismiss the petition. The case law makes clear that "one who objects to theact of an administrative agency must exhaust available administrative remedies before beingpermitted to litigate in a court of law" (Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46NY2d 52, 57 [1978]; accord Matter ofConnor v Town of Niskayuna, 82 AD3d 1329, 1330 [2011]; Matter of Ford vSnashall, 275 AD2d 493, 494 [2000]). Because application of the doctrine "furthers thesalutory goal[ ] of. . . preventing premature judicial interference" with the administrative process(Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d at 57), exceptions thereto arelimited—namely, "when the agency's action is challenged as unconstitutional, resort to anadministrative remedy would be futile or pursuit of the administrative remedy would causeirreparable injury" (Matter of Ford v Snashall, 275 AD2d at 494; see Town of Oyster Bay v Kirkland, 81AD3d 812, 815 [2011], appeal dismissed 17 NY3d 778 [2011]). Thus, "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, courts are constrained not tointerject themselves into ongoing administrative proceedings until final resolution of thoseproceedings before the agency" (Town of Oyster Bay v Kirkland, 81 AD3d at 815[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
Here, the Hearing Officer's ruling as to which party must bear the burden of proof at thescheduled administrative hearing is interlocutory in nature (see Matter of Lempesis vMills, 300 AD2d 733, 733 [2002]) and, as such, "is not subject to review pursuant to CPLRarticle 78 until the administrative proceeding is completed and a final determination is rendered"(Matter of Patchogue Nursing Ctr. v New York State Dept. of Health, 189 AD2d 1054,1056 [1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 711 [1993]). Should petitioner be aggrieved by the finaldetermination made at the conclusion of his administrative hearing, "he may at that time contestthe interlocutory rulings made during the course thereof" (Matter of Ford v Snashall, 275AD2d at 494; see People ex rel. Victory v Herbert, 277 AD2d 933, 934 [2000], lvdenied 96 NY2d 705 [2001]; Matter of Patchogue Nursing Ctr. v New York State Dept.of Health, 189 AD2d at 1056). In the interim, the mere assertion of a due process violationdoes not excuse petitioner from pursuing available administrative remedies that can afford therequested relief (see Town of Oyster Bay v Kirkland, 81 AD3d at 816; Arbor HillPartners v New York State Commr. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 267 AD2d 675, 676 n[1999]; Matter of Valvano v Jones, 122 AD2d 336, 336 [1986]). In light of thisconclusion, we need not address the parties' remaining contentions regarding the particularprocedures or guidelines to be applied at the administrative hearing.
Rose, J.P., Malone Jr., Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isreversed, on the law, without costs, and petition dismissed. [Prior Case History: 28 Misc 3d407.]