| Thomas v Reddy |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06026 [86 AD3d 602] |
| July 19, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Robert Thomas, Individually and as Executor of Deborah Thomas,Respondent, v Stanley Reddy et al., Appellants, et al.,Defendant. |
—[*1] Jonathan I. Edelstein, New York, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for wrongful death and medical malpractice, etc., thedefendants Stanley Reddy, South Nassau Communities Hospital, Cesar Florita, and Jovita Crastaappeal, as limited by the brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Sher, J.), dated August 3, 2010, as denied that branch of their motion which was for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Stanley Reddy andSouth Nassau Communities Hospital.
Ordered that the appeal by the defendants Cesar Florita and Jovita Crasta is dismissed asabandoned; and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from by the defendants Stanley Reddyand South Nassau Communities Hospital; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff payable by the defendants StanleyReddy and South Nassau Communities Hospital.
The plaintiff's decedent checked into the defendant South Nassau Communities Hospital(hereinafter the hospital) on November 6, 2006, seeking treatment for "manic depression." Thedecedent was pregnant at that time, and had a history of suicide attempts, psychiatrichospitalizations, and treatment for bipolar disorder. The hospital treated the decedent severaltimes over the course of the following months in its outpatient program. On February 28, 2007,the decedent told her obstetrician/gynecologist that she hoped that her fetus would not have aheartbeat during a sonogram, and that she would use her husband's gun to kill herself if she couldfind it. She was referred to the hospital's inpatient unit that day.
The defendant Dr. Stanley Reddy took over the decedent's treatment on March 12, 2007,when the physician who had been treating the decedent during her admission went on vacation.At his deposition, Dr. Reddy admitted that he had never seen the decedent's outpatient records.[*2]Further, Dr. Reddy testified that he had never seen a progressnote, dated March 11, 2007, stating that the decedent was having "altered thought toward [herb]aby," and that her plan of care had not been met, and that no one had told him that the plan ofcare was not being met. Dr. Reddy discharged the decedent on the afternoon of March 14, 2007.Later that night, the decedent killed herself by suffocating herself with a plastic bag.
The decedent's husband, as executor of the decedent's estate and individually, commencedthis action to recover damages for wrongful death and medical malpractice against, amongothers, Dr. Reddy, the hospital, Cesar Florita, and Jovita Crasta (hereinafter collectively thedefendants). The defendants moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaintinsofar as asserted against Reddy and the hospital (hereinafter together the appellants). TheSupreme Court, among other things, denied that branch of the motion.
A psychiatrist may not be held liable for a mere error in professional judgment (see Betty v City of New York, 65AD3d 507, 509 [2009]; Fotinas v Westchester County Med. Ctr., 300 AD2d 437,438-439 [2002]; Seibert v Fink, 280 AD2d 661 [2001]; Weinreb v Rice, 266AD2d 454, 455 [1999]). However, a psychiatrist may be held liable where a treatment decisionwas based on " 'something less than a professional medical determination' " (Betty v City ofNew York, 65 AD3d at 509, quoting Fotinas v Westchester County Med. Ctr., 300AD2d at 439 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Seibert v Fink, 280 AD2d at 661;Weinreb v Rice, 266 AD2d at 455). "A decision that is without proper medicalfoundation, that is, one which is not the product of a careful examination, is not to be legallyinsulated as a professional medical judgment" (Fotinas v Westchester County Med. Ctr.,300 AD3d at 439 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Seibert v Fink, 280 AD2d 661[2001]).
Here, the appellants established, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawby submitting the affidavit of an expert psychiatrist, who concluded that the appellants did notdepart from good and accepted medical practice in making the decision to discharge the decedent(see Betty v City of New York, 65 AD3d at 509; Fotinas v Westchester County Med.Ctr., 300 AD2d at 438; seegenerally Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18, 24 [2011]). However, in opposition, theplaintiffs submitted an affidavit from an expert who opined, inter alia, that the appellants haddeparted from accepted standards of psychiatric care by making an incomplete and superficialassessment of the decedent's mental condition prior to discharge. Through this affidavit, and Dr.Reddy's deposition testimony, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether theappellants exercised something less than professional judgment in deciding to discharge thedecedent (see Fotinas v Westchester County Med. Ctr., 300 AD2d at 438; Seibert vFink, 280 AD2d 661 [2001]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branchof the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against the appellants. Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur. [PriorCase History: 2010 NY Slip Op 32232(U).]