| Henry v Eleventh Ave., L.P. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06118 [87 AD3d 523] |
| August 2, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Patrick Henry et al., Respondents, v Eleventh Avenue,L.P., et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Tomkiel & Tomkiel, PC, Scarsdale, N.Y. (Matthew Tomkiel of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated June 23, 2010, which granted theplaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the cause of action pursuant to Labor Law §240 (1).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
During the construction of a new high-rise building in Manhattan, the plaintiff, Patrick Henry(hereinafter the injured plaintiff), a carpenter, was working on the roof of a shanty that waslocated in the basement and used to store tools for the project. Above the shanty was a first floorconcrete slab with, inter alia, metal pipes attached to it. Approximately four to five feet of spaceexisted between the roof of the shanty and the first floor slab. While the injured plaintiff wasinstalling waterproofing on the roof of the shanty, he struck his head against something and felleight feet to the ground. He had not been provided with any safety devices to prevent or protectagainst a fall. The injured plaintiff and his wife, derivatively, commenced this action against thedefendants alleging, inter alia, a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1). Thereafter, the plaintiffsmoved for summary judgment on the cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1). TheSupreme Court granted the motion. We affirm.
Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes liability upon owners and contractors who violate thestatute by failing to provide or erect necessary safety devices for the protection of workersexposed to elevation-related hazards, where such failure is a proximate cause of the accident (see Balzer v City of New York, 61AD3d 796, 797 [2009]). Labor Law § 240 (1) was specifically "designed to preventthose types of accidents in which the scaffold, hoist, stay, ladder or other protective deviceproved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from theapplication of the force of gravity to an object or person" (Ross v Curtis-PalmerHydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 [1993]). Labor Law § 240 (1) "is to be construedas liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was thus framed"(Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 513 [1991] [internal quotationmarks omitted]). To establish a prima facie violation of Labor Law § 240 (1), a plaintiff[*2]must demonstrate that the defendants violated the statute andthat the violation was the proximate cause of his or her injuries (see Andro v City of New York, 62AD3d 919 [2009]; Reaber vConnequot Cent. School Dist. No. 7, 57 AD3d 640, 641 [2008]).
Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawby submitting evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the defendants failed to provide the injuredplaintiff with an adequate safety device and that this failure was a proximate cause of his injuries(see Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 562 [1993]; Cordero v KaiserOrg., 288 AD2d 424, 425-426 [2001]). In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triableissue of fact. Contrary to the defendants' contention, the injured plaintiff's eight-foot fall from theroof of the shanty is the type of elevation-related hazard that is contemplated by Labor Law§ 240 (1) (see Striegel v Hillcrest Hgts. Dev. Corp., 100 NY2d 974, 978 [2003];Bland v Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452, 459 [1985]; Danielewski v Kenyon Realty Co., 2 AD3d 666, 666-667 [2003]).Moreover, the risk of the injured plaintiff hitting his head against the concrete slab or an objectprotruding therefrom, located only four to five feet above his head, "was neither so extraordinarynor so attenuated as to constitute a superseding cause sufficient to relieve [the defendants] ofliability" (Cordero v Kaiser Org., 288 AD2d at 426; see Mooney v PCM Dev.Co., 238 AD2d 487, 488 [1997]).
The defendants' remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Eng, Sgroi and Miller,JJ., concur.