| Brash v Richards |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06210 [87 AD3d 556] |
| August 9, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Nikiki Brash, Respondent, v Neil M. Richards, Defendant,and Harrison Mu, Appellant. |
—[*1] Goldstein & Goldstein, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Cindy A. Moonsammy of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, thedefendant Harrison Mu appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the SupremeCourt, Kings County (Dabiri, J.), dated August 14, 2009, as denied his motion pursuant to CPLR503 (a); 510 and 511 to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Queens County.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise ofdiscretion, with costs, the motion of the defendant Harrison Mu pursuant to CPLR 503 (a); 510and 511 to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Queens County is granted, andthe Clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, is directed to deliver to the Clerk of the SupremeCourt, Queens County, all papers filed in the action and certified copies of all minutes and entries(see CPLR 511 [d]).
A demand to change venue based on the designation of an improper county (seeCPLR 510 [1]) "shall be served with the answer or before the answer is served" (CPLR 511[a]; see Thomas v Guttikonda, 68AD3d 853, 854 [2009]). Since the defendant Harrison Mu did not serve his demand for achange of venue until after he served his answer, he was not entitled to change venue as of right(see Thomas v Guttikonda, 68 AD3d at 854; Jeffrey L. Rosenberg & Assoc., LLC v Lajaunie, 54 AD3d 813, 816[2008]; Palla v Doctors Hosp. of Staten Is., 248 AD2d 603 [1998]). Thus, his motionbecame one addressed to the Supreme Court's discretion (see Thomas v Guttikonda, 68AD3d at 854; Jeffrey L. Rosenberg & Assoc., LLC v Lajaunie, 54 AD3d at 816; Pallav Doctors Hosp. of Staten Is., 248 AD2d at 604).
Kings County is not a proper county here, as none of the parties resided there at the time theaction was commenced (see Herrera vR. Conley Inc., 52 AD3d 218 [2008]; Neu v St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 27 AD3d 538 [2006];Peretzman v Elias, 221 AD2d 192 [1995]). When the plaintiff commenced this action, hedid not specify the basis for placing venue in Kings County and, if based on his residence, he didnot specify his address, as required by CPLR 305 (a) (see Accardi v Kaufmann, 82 AD3d 803 [2011]; Philogene vFuller Auto Leasing, 167 AD2d 178 [1990]; cf. Thomas v Guttikonda, 68 AD3d[*2]at 854). Further, Mu moved promptly to change venue afterascertaining the plaintiff's true residence (see Neu v St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 27 AD3dat 539; Supino v PV Holding Corp., 291 AD2d 489 [2002]). Accordingly, the SupremeCourt improvidently exercised its discretion in denying Mu's motion to change the venue of theaction from Kings County to Queens County. Mastro, J.P., Chambers, Austin and Cohen, JJ.,concur.