| Conte v County of Nassau |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06212 [87 AD3d 558] |
| August 9, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Joanne Conte, Appellant, v County of Nassau et al.,Respondents, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] John Ciampoli, County Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Gerald R. Podlesak of counsel), forrespondent County of Nassau. Sokoloff Stern, LLP, Westbury, N.Y. (Steven C. Stern and Kiera J. Meehan of counsel), forrespondent City of Glen Cove.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by herbrief, from (1) so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Cozzens, Jr., J.),entered October 5, 2009, as granted that branch of the cross motion of the defendant County ofNassau which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it,and denied, as academic, the plaintiff's motion for a further deposition of the County, and (2) somuch of an order of the same court entered October 16, 2009, as granted those branches of themotion of the defendant City of Glen Cove which were to quash certain nonparty subpoenas.
Ordered that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from so much of the orderentered October 5, 2009, as denied, as academic, the plaintiff's motion for a further deposition ofthe County, is treated as an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order, andleave to appeal is granted (see Sainz v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 106 AD2d500 [1984]); and it is further,
Ordered that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the cross motion of the defendant Countyof Nassau which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted againstit. The County demonstrated, prima facie, that the subject sidewalk and catch basin were installedand maintained by the defendant City of Glen Cove and not the County, and, in opposition, theplaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). As such, the Supreme Court properly denied, as academic, the plaintiff'smotion for a further deposition of the County.[*2]
While CPLR 3101 (a) provides for full disclosure of allevidence material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action, unlimited disclosureis not required, and supervision of disclosure is generally left to the trial court's broad discretion(see Constantino v Dock's Clam Bar &Pasta House, 60 AD3d 612 [2009]; Youngquist v Youngquist, 44 AD3d 1034, 1035 [2007]; Auerbach v Klein, 30 AD3d 451,452 [2006]; Silcox v City of New York, 233 AD2d 494 [1996]; NBT Bancorp vFleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 192 AD2d 1032, 1033 [1993]). Here, the Supreme Courtprovidently exercised it discretion in quashing the nonparty subpoenas, as the plaintiff's overlybroad discovery requests were neither material nor necessary to the prosecution of the action (see Young v Baker, 21 AD3d 550,550-551 [2005]; White Bay Enters. v Newsday, Inc., 288 AD2d 211, 212 [2001];Myrie v Shelley, 237 AD2d 337, 339 [1997]; Ayubo v Eastman Kodak Co., 158AD2d 641, 642 [1990]). Additionally, the plaintiff failed to show that the disclosure sought couldnot be obtained from sources other than from the nonparties (see Kooper v Kooper, 74 AD3d 6, 16-17 [2010]; Moran v McCarthy, Safrath & Carbone,P.C., 31 AD3d 725, 726 [2006]; Tannenbaum v Tenenbaum, 8 AD3d 360 [2004]; Lanzello vLakritz, 287 AD2d 601 [2001]; Tsachalis v City of Mount Vernon, 262 AD2d 399,401 [1999]; Matter of Validation Review Assoc. [Berkun—Schimel], 237 AD2d614, 615 [1997]). Dillon, J.P., Leventhal, Hall and Lott, JJ., concur.