| Marino v Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Salibury & Cambria,LLP |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06218 [87 AD3d 566] |
| August 9, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Christine Marino et al., Respondents, v Lipsitz, Green,Fahringer, Roll, Salibury & Cambria, LLP, et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, New York, N.Y., for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendants appeal from so much ofan order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), entered November 1, 2010,as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and thedefendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
"To state a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must allege:(1) that the attorney 'failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonlypossessed by a member of the legal profession,' and (2) that the attorney's breach of the dutyproximately caused the plaintiff actual and ascertainable damages" (Dempster v Liotti, 86 AD3d 169,176 [2011], quoting Leder vSpiegel, 9 NY3d 836, 837 [2007], cert denied sub nom. Spiegel v Rowland, 552US 1257 [2008]; see Rudolf v Shayne,Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442 [2007]).
"To establish the element of causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would haveprevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages but for the attorney'snegligence" (Snolis v Clare, 81AD3d 923, 925 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 702 [2011]; see Rudolf v Shayne,Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d at 442; Kluczka v Lecci, 63 AD3d 796, 797 [2009]; Wray v Mallilo & Grossman, 54 AD3d328, 329 [2008]).
"On a motion for summary judgment in the legal malpractice context, the defendant must'demonstrate that the plaintiff is unable to prove at least one of the essential elements of a legalmalpractice cause of action' (Greene vSager, 78 AD3d 777, 779 [2010]; see Eisenberger v Septimus, 44 AD3d 994 [2007]; Kotzian v McCarthy, 36 AD3d863 [2007]). Once a defendant makes this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to theplaintiff to raise an issue of fact requiring a trial (see Siciliano v Forchelli & Forchelli, 17AD3d at 345; Schadoff v Russ, 278 AD2d 222 [2000])" (Dempster v Liotti, 169AD3d at 181-182).[*2]
Here, the defendants established their prima facieentitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the first cause of action alleging legalmalpractice by demonstrating that the plaintiffs would be able to prove neither of the essentialelements of that cause of action. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Thus, theSupreme Court should have awarded the defendants summary judgment dismissing the firstcause of action.
Further, the Supreme Court should have awarded the defendants summary judgmentdismissing the second cause of action alleging breach of contract as duplicative of the legalmalpractice cause of action (seeScartozzi v Potruch, 72 AD3d 787, 789 [2010]; Kvetnaya v Tylo, 49 AD3d 608, 609 [2008]; Campbell v Tamsen, 37 AD3d636, 637 [2007]; Town of N.Hempstead v Winston & Strawn, LLP, 28 AD3d 746, 749 [2006]; Ferdinand v Crecca & Blair, 5 AD3d538, 539 [2004]). Skelos, J.P., Belen, Hall and Roman, JJ., concur.