| Krausch v Incorporated Vil. of Shoreham |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06368 [87 AD3d 715] |
| August 30, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| William R. Krausch et al., Respondents, v IncorporatedVillage of Shoreham, Appellant. |
—[*1] Anthony J. Montiglio, Mineola, N.Y., for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals, as limitedby its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Molia, J.), datedApril 12, 2010, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and thedefendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
On the evening of July 26, 2006, the plaintiff William R. Krausch allegedly fell andsustained injuries when he placed his foot on a broken curb adjacent to a parking lot owned andoperated by the defendant, Incorporated Village of Shoreham. The injured plaintiff and his wife,suing derivatively, thereafter commenced this action against the Village. The Village moved forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it had received no prior writtennotice of the allegedly hazardous condition, as was required by Village Law § 6-628. In theorder appealed from, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied the Village's motion,finding a triable issue of fact as to whether the location of the accident was a public area withinthe purview of the Village Law. We reverse the order insofar as appealed from.
The prior written notice requirement of Village Law § 6-628 is applicable to amunicipal parking lot, and the location of the injured plaintiff's accident was a public area towhich Village Law § 6-628 applies (see Groninger v Village of Mamaroneck, 17 NY3d 125, 128-129[2011]). The parking lot at issue serves the "functional purpose" of a highway as set forth inVehicle and Traffic Law § 118 (id. at 129). The mere fact that access to theparking lot area was controlled by an electronic gate did not raise a triable issue of fact as towhether the lot was open to the public (see Lauria v City of New Rochelle, 225 AD2d1013 [1996]). The Village established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawby submitting proof that a search of its records revealed no prior written notice of a defectivecondition at the parking lot and its adjacent curbing at any time prior to the subject accident(see Groninger v Village of Mamaroneck, 17 NY3d at 129-130).
Once the Village satisfied its burden of showing a lack of prior written notice, the plaintiffswere required to come forward with admissible evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as [*2]to whether written notice was given or whether the Village createdor exacerbated the alleged defective condition through its affirmative acts of negligence (see Walker v Incorporated Vil. ofFreeport, 52 AD3d 697, 697-698 [2008]). The plaintiffs failed to meet that burden.Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the Village's motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint. Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.