Matter of Graves v Doar
2011 NY Slip Op 06380 [87 AD3d 744]
August 30, 2011
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 28, 2011


In the Matter of Sheila Graves et al., Respondents,
v
RobertDoar, as Commissioner of the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance of the New YorkState Department of Family Assistance, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

—[*1]Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Benjamin N. Gutman andRichard O. Jackson of counsel), for appellant.

John Castellano, Islip Terrace, N.Y., and Law Office of Peter Vollmer, P.C., Sea Cliff, N.Y.,for respondents (one brief filed).

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review several determinations ofRobert Doar, Commissioner of the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance of the NewYork State Department of Family Assistance, each dated February 23, 2006, which, after a fairhearing, affirmed several determinations of John E. Imhof, Commissioner of the Nassau CountyDepartment of Social Services, each dated December 19, 2004, inter alia, reducing the foodstamp benefits of the petitioners/plaintiffs and action, inter alia, for declaratory and injunctiverelief, Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance of theNew York State Department of Family Assistance appeals, (1) as limited by his brief, from somuch an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Woodard, J.), dated April 16, 2010, asgranted the petitioners/plaintiffs' motion for an award of an attorney's fee pursuant to the EqualAccess to Justice Act (CPLR art 86) to the extent that it determined that an order andinterlocutory judgment of the same court dated December 13, 2007, inter alia, declaring that theGroup Home Standardized Benefits Program of the Office of Temporary and DisabilityAssistance was implemented in violation of article IV, § 8 of the New York Constitutionand article 2 of the State Administrative Procedure Act, constituted a final judgment within themeaning of CPLR 8602 (c), and that Robert Doar was not substantially justified in taking theposition that the Group Home Standardized Benefits Program of the Office of Temporary andDisability Assistance was exempt from the rule-making requirements of article IV, § 8 ofthe New York Constitution and article 2 of the State Administrative Procedure Act, and (2) froma money judgment of the same court entered May 21, 2010, which, upon the order, is in favor ofthe petitioners/plaintiffs and against Robert Doar, as Commissioner of the Office of Temporaryand Disability Assistance of the New York State Department of Family Assistance, in the sum of$335,003.58, as and for an award of an attorney's fee.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the money judgment is affirmed; and it is further,[*2]

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to therespondents.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appealtherefrom terminated with the entry of the money judgment in the action and proceeding (seeMatter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order arebrought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the money judgment (seeCPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

An award of an attorney's fee under the Equal Access to Justice Act (CPLR art 86) isgenerally left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see Matter of Priester v Dowling,231 AD2d 638 [1996]). Under the circumstances of this case, the award of an attorney's fee wasnot an improvident exercise of discretion.

Contrary to the appellant's contention, an award of an attorney's fee is not limited to caseswhere there has been a final judgment in an action or proceeding but, rather, may be awardedwhere a plaintiff or petitioner has prevailed in an intermediate order or interlocutory judgment onan issue that is central to the case (see MacDonald v Schweiker, 553 F Supp 536, 539[1982]). Here, the petitioners/plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin the appellant, among others,from implementing the Group Home Standardized Benefits Program (hereinafter the GHSBP), tocompel him to provide monthly food stamp benefits to group home recipients of SupplementalSecurity Income (hereinafter SSI) benefits in amounts equal to those received by PublicAssistance (hereinafter PA) recipients, to compel the State to promulgate regulations to governthe operation of the GHSBP in accordance with the rule-making requirements of article IV,§ 8 of the New York Constitution and article 2 of the State Administrative Procedure Act,to obtain the benefits they would have received since January 1, 2005, had the GHSBP neverbeen implemented, and to annul the determination to reduce the monthly food stamp benefits ofone of the petitioners/plaintiffs. The petitioners/plaintiffs obtained substantial relief in an orderand interlocutory judgment, including (1) an injunction prohibiting the appellant from applyingthe GHSBP's methodology of calculating food stamp benefits unless and until formal regulationswere properly promulgated, (2) the annulment of the 2004 fair hearing determinations whichaffirmed the reduction of food stamp benefits to the petitioners/plaintiffs pursuant to the GHSBP,(3) a directive to the appellant and the commissioner of the relevant county social servicesdepartment mandating the reinstatement of the petitioners/plaintiffs' food stamp benefits in theamount issued to them in the month prior to the implementation of the GHSBP, and (4) adirective to the appellant and the commissioner of the relevant county social services departmentmandating the restoration of the petitioners/plaintiffs' food stamp benefits retroactively to themonth prior to the implementation of the GHSBP.

"The determination of whether the State's position was substantially justified is committed tothe sound discretion of the court of first instance and is reviewable as an exercise of judicialdiscretion" (Matter of Simpkins v Riley, 193 AD2d 1009, 1010-1011 [1993]). Theburden of establishing substantial justification rests with the State, which must make a strongshowing to support its position (see Matter of Barnett v New York State Dept. of SocialServs., 212 AD2d 696 [1995]). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion inconcluding that the appellant was not substantially justified in taking the position that theGHSBP was exempt from the rule-making requirements of the New York Constitution and StateAdministrative Procedure Act. Rivera, J.P., Eng, Roman and Miller, JJ., concur.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.