| Matter of Matos v New York State Bd. of Parole |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06443 [87 AD3d 1193] |
| September 15, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Miquel Matos, Appellant, v New York State Boardof Parole et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank K. Walsh of counsel), forrespondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Richards, J.), entered December 17, 2010 inClinton County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78, to review a determination of respondent Board of Parole denying petitioner's requestfor parole release.
In 1980, petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree and wassentenced to concurrent prison terms of 20 years to life and 25 years to life. In December 2009,he made his fourth appearance before respondent Board of Parole seeking to be released to parolesupervision. At the conclusion of the hearing, his request was denied and he was ordered held anadditional 24 months. Petitioner took an administrative appeal and, when he did not receive atimely response, he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court dismissed thepetition, resulting in this appeal.
We affirm. It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not bedisturbed as long as the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259-i are satisfied (see Matter of McAllister v New York StateDiv. of Parole, 78 AD3d 1413, 1414 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 707 [2011]; Matter of Williams v Alexander, 71AD3d 1264, 1265 [2010]). Petitioner's claim that the Board failed to properly consider thestatutory factors is belied by the record as it reveals that, in denying petitioner's request forrelease, the Board took into account the serious nature of petitioner's crimes, his criminal history,prison disciplinary record, program accomplishments and postrelease plans (see Matter of Sutherland v Evans, 82AD3d 1428, 1429 [2011]; Matter ofCarter v Evans, 81 AD3d 1031, 1031 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011]).[*2]Although petitioner contends that the Board placed undueemphasis on the serious nature of the crimes, it was entitled to do so as it was not required togive each statutory factor equal weight (see Matter of Watson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 78 AD3d1367, 1368 [2010]). Indeed, the serious nature of the crimes is a factor to which the Board isentitled to give great weight (see Matterof Gonzalez v Chair, N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 72 AD3d 1368, 1369 [2010]).Furthermore, while it is unclear whether the Board considered the sentencing minutes, any errorin this regard was harmless given that the sentencing minutes do not disclose that the sentencingcourt made any recommendations concerning parole (see Matter of Davis v Lemons, 73 AD3d 1354 [2010]; Matter of Ruiz v New York State Div. ofParole, 70 AD3d 1162, 1163 [2010]). In fact, petitioner was sentenced to the maximumpermissible term of imprisonment on one of the counts of which he was convicted. In sum, we donot find that the Board's decision exhibits " 'irrationality bordering on impropriety' " (Matterof Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v New YorkState Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]) and, therefore, we decline to disturb it.Petitioner's remaining contentions, to the extent not specifically addressed herein, are unavailing.
Spain, J.P., Rose, Stein, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.