| Matter of Stateway Plaza Shopping Ctr. v Assessor of City ofWatertown |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 06758 [87 AD3d 1359] |
| September 30, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Stateway Plaza Shopping Center, by Longley JonesManagement Corp., as Managing Agent, Respondent, v Assessor of City of Watertown et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Gilberti Stinziano Heintz & Smith, P.C., Syracuse (Martin A. Lynn of counsel), forpetitioner-respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Jefferson County (Hugh A. Gilbert, J.), enteredNovember 23, 2010 in a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7. The order, insofar as appealedfrom, denied the motion of respondents for summary judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7,challenging the tax assessment on the subject parcel for the 2009 tax year. Petitioner hadchallenged the assessments for the subject parcel for the 2006 and 2007 tax years, and thoseassessments were upheld by Supreme Court in judgments that are now final. Respondents movedfor summary judgment dismissing the petition or, in the alternative, for an order vacatingpetitioner's note of issue pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.21 (e) and 202.59, which containprerequisites for filing a note of issue and certificate of readiness. Petitioner did not oppose thealternative request for relief, provided that it was permitted to re-file the note of issue within oneyear, and the court granted that alternative relief without prejudice to petitioner's right to re-filewithin one year of the date of the court's order. Respondents contend on appeal that the court wasrequired to grant their motion insofar as they sought summary judgment dismissing the petition.We affirm inasmuch as, contrary to respondents' contention, RPTL 727 (3) does not bar thisproceeding. We note at the outset that respondents are in fact aggrieved by the order, "despite thefact that the relief [they] requested in the alternative, to wit, [striking the note of issue], wasgranted . . . The [primary] relief [they] clearly sought was dismissal of the [petition]. . . , and the denial of so much of [their] motion as was for dismissal involved asubstantial right of" respondents (Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 AD2d 580,581 [1987]).
In pertinent part, RPTL 727 states that, "(1) Except as hereinafter provided, . . .where an assessment being reviewed pursuant to this article is found to be unlawful, unequal,excessive or misclassified by final court order or judgment, the assessed valuation so determinedshall not be [*2]changed for such property for the next threesucceeding assessment rolls . . . (3) No petition for review of the assessment onsuch property shall be filed while the provisions of subdivision one of this section are applicableto such property." It is well settled that, "as a general proposition, RPTL 727 precludes taxpayersfrom challenging an assessment for three years following a successful court challenge to thatassessment" (Matter of Curtis/Palmer Hydroelectric Co. v Town of Corinth, 306 AD2d794, 796 [2003]; see Matter of MRERealty Corp. v Assessor of Town of Greenburgh, 33 AD3d 802, 803-804 [2006]). Here,it is undisputed that the prior challenges to the assessments for the 2006 and 2007 tax years wereunsuccessful, and thus RPTL 727 does not preclude the instant challenge.
Contrary to respondents' further contention, the intent of the Legislature in enacting RPTL727 does not require a different result. "As this is a question of statutory interpretation, we turnfirst to the plain language of the statute[ ] as the best evidence of legislative intent" (Matter of Malta Town Ctr. I, Ltd. v Townof Malta Bd. of Assessment Review, 3 NY3d 563, 568 [2004]). Here, the Legislatureprovided therein that an assessment may not be reviewed for three years following a successfulcourt challenge if the "assessment being reviewed pursuant to this article is found to be unlawful,unequal, excessive or misclassified by final court order or judgment" (RPTL 727 [1]).Respondents' proposed interpretation, i.e., that the Legislature intended the statute to applywhenever there was a prior court challenge notwithstanding the outcome of that challenge, wouldrender that statutory language meaningless and would thereby violate the well-settled rule ofstatutory construction that "[a] construction rendering statutory language superfluous is to beavoided" (Matter of Branford House v Michetti, 81 NY2d 681, 688 [1993]; seeMcKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 231). Present—Smith, J.P.,Centra, Carni, Green and Martoche, JJ.