| Matter of Duane S., Jr. (Duane S.) |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 07059 [88 AD3d 727] |
| October 4, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Duane S., Jr. Administration for Children'sServices, Respondent; Duane S., Appellant, et al., Respondent. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Larry A. Sonnenshein andAndrew S. Wellin of counsel), for petitioner-respondent. Karen P. Simmons, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Janet Neustaetter of counsel; Tammy E. Linn on thebrief), Attorney for the Child.
In a child protective proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the father appeals,as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of disposition of the Family Court, KingsCounty (Danoff, J.), dated August 9, 2010, as, after an inquest following his default in appearingat a fact-finding hearing, upon the denial of his request for an adjournment, and upon afact-finding order of the same court dated April 26, 2010, in effect, granting the petitioner'sunopposed motion for summary judgment, and finding that he derivatively abused the childDuane S., Jr., placed the child under the supervision of the Commissioner of Social Services ofKings County until the completion of the next permanency hearing.
Ordered that the appeal from the order of disposition is dismissed except insofar as it bringsup for review the denial of the father's request for an adjournment; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs ordisbursements.
On the father's appeal from the order of disposition dated August 9, 2010, he seeks tochallenge so much of the Family Court's fact-finding order dated April 26, 2010, as, in effect,[*2]granted the petitioner's unopposed motion for summaryjudgment and found that he derivatively abused the child Duane S., Jr. Since the fact-findingorder was entered upon the father's default, " 'review is limited to matters which were the subjectof contest below,' " namely, the denial of the request made by the father's counsel for anadjournment (Matter of Paulino vCamacho, 36 AD3d 821, 822 [2007], quoting Matter of Constance P. v Avraam G., 27 AD3d 754, 755 [2006]; see Atwater v Mace, 39 AD3d573, 574 [2007]; Tun v Aw, 10AD3d 651, 652 [2004]; Matter of Vidal v Mintzer, 309 AD2d 756, 758 [2003];Conner v Conner, 240 AD2d 614, 615 [1997]).
The granting of an adjournment for any purpose rests in the sound discretion of the trial courtupon a balanced consideration of all relevant factors (see Matter of Anthony M., 63NY2d 270, 283 [1984]; Matter of LatrellS. [Christine K.], 80 AD3d 618, 619 [2011]; Matter of Venditto v Davis, 39 AD3d 555 [2007]; Matter ofPaulino v Camacho, 36 AD3d at 822). The determination to grant or deny an adjournmentwill not be overturned absent an improvident exercise of discretion (see Matter of AnthonyM., 63 NY2d at 283-284; Atwater v Mace, 39 AD3d at 574; York v York,250 AD2d 841 [1998]). Under the circumstances here, the Family Court providently exercised itsdiscretion in denying the father's counsel's request for an adjournment. Dillon, J.P., Eng, Sgroiand Miller, JJ., concur.