| Matter of Joseph C. (Anthony C.) |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 07126 [88 AD3d 478] |
| October 11, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Joseph C. and Another, Children Alleged to beNeglected. Anthony C., Appellant; Administration for Children's Services,Respondent. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Susan Paulson of counsel), forrespondent. Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Judith Waksberg of counsel),attorney for the children.
Amended order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Karen I. Lupuloff, J.), enteredon or about June 29, 2010, which, upon a fact-finding determination that respondent furtherneglected his stepson, Joseph C., and derivatively neglected his biological son, Tristin C.,released Joseph to the custody of his biological father with six months' supervision by theAdministration for Children's Services, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
A neglected child is defined as a child less than 18 years of age whose physical, mental, oremotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a resultof the failure of his parent to exercise a reasonable degree of minimal care in providing the childwith proper supervision or guardianship (Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i]). In this instance, theneglect finding was based on the court's conclusion that respondent unreasonably inflicted orallowed to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof, through the infliction of excessivecorporal punishment (see Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [B]).
Here, a preponderance of the evidence credited by the court supports its finding thatrespondent neglected his stepson by inflicting excessive corporal punishment on him (seeFamily Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [B]; Matter of Syed I., 61 AD3d 580 [2009]). Respondent admitted thathe punished his stepson by requiring him to hold himself in a "push-up" position and kneel onuncooked grains of rice for extended periods of time. We agree with the court's finding that theseactions are not "appropriate forms of discipline." Furthermore, to the extent respondent assertsthat his actions did not cause his stepson any physical, emotional, or mental injury, we note thatthe absence of actual injury does not preclude a finding of neglect (see Matter of TammieZ., 105 AD2d 463, 464 [1984], affd 66 NY2d 1 [1985]).[*2]
The derivative finding of neglect of respondent'sbiological son was proper as respondent's inappropriate and excessive corporal punishment of his11-year-old stepson clearly demonstrated a sufficiently faulty understanding of his parental dutiesto warrant an inference of an ongoing danger to the approximately two-year-old child as thisCourt did in Matter of Syed I. (61AD3d 580 [2009], supra).
However, unlike Syed I., where we noted that the mother was aware of the father'sdeteriorating mental health and that she could not protect the children when he hit them,respondent here has admitted that this was "not his finest parenting moment," demonstrating anappreciation of Family Court's conclusion that the punishments were grossly disproportionate tothe offenses committed by his stepson. Furthermore, we take judicial notice of the fact thatrespondent's biological son has been returned to his care following respondent's satisfactorycompletion of a six-month period of Administration for Children's Services supervision.Nonetheless, we are reluctant to set aside the dispositions and credibility determinations of theFamily Court. However, we urge the agency to evaluate any future complaints of abuse or neglectconcerning the biological son, should there be any, on their own merits and not to be undulyinfluenced by the existing derivative neglect finding.
We have considered respondent's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.Concur—Saxe, J.P., Friedman, Acosta, DeGrasse and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.