| Craine v NYSARC, Inc. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 07329 [88 AD3d 1105] |
| October 20, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| William C. Craine, as President of the Chenango County Chapter,NYSARC, Inc., Appellant, v NYSARC, Inc., Respondent. |
—[*1] Rupp, Baase, Pfalzgraf, Cunningham & Coppola, L.L.C., Buffalo (Lisa A. Coppola ofcounsel), for appellant. Nixon Peabody, L.L.P., Albany (Daniel J. Hurteau of counsel), for respondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Rumsey, J.), entered August 23, 2010in Chenango County, which partially granted defendant's motion for summary judgment anddismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff lacked capacity to sue.
In 1963, a group of parents in Chenango County formed a group for the purpose ofimproving opportunities for the education, care, and vocational training of their developmentallydisabled children. Shortly thereafter, the group became the Chenango County Chapter ofNYSARC, Inc. (hereinafter Chapter), by affiliating with defendant, a not-for-profit corporationwith the principal purpose of assisting developmentally disabled individuals in New York State.The Chapter has since been providing services to Chenango County's developmentally disabledresidents through operations including, among other things, community residences, dayhabilitation and respite programming, and mental hygiene, social work and dental services. TheChapter covers the expenses of its activities with its own revenues, a significant portion of whichare derived from its sheltered employment program, a packaging plant with average annualrevenues of $4.1 million. In support of its operations, the Chapter has purchased various parcelsof real property valued collectively at about $6 million.
Defendant recently reevaluated its corporate structure because of concerns about the [*2]potential that defendant or its chapters could be held responsible forliabilities of another chapter. The Chapter objected to defendant's proposed restructuring and,instead, sought defendant's approval to incorporate separately while continuing a relationshipwith defendant on a contractual basis. Defendant refused to approve this plan and plaintiff, theChapter's president, then commenced the instant action seeking, among other things, a judgmentdeclaring that the Chapter is a separate and distinct entity from defendant and that the Chaptercan incorporate, and directing defendant to transfer any assets held in defendant's name for thebenefit of the Chapter to the newly incorporated organization. Defendant answered, raisingseveral counterclaims and asserting affirmative defenses, including plaintiff's lack of standingand capacity to sue. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. Supreme Courtgranted defendant's motion on the ground that plaintiff lacked capacity to sue and, therefore, itdeclined to decide, among other things, plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff appeals.
Supreme Court held that plaintiff lacked the capacity to sue, finding that the Chapter ismerely an operational unit of defendant with no separate legal existence as an unincorporatedassociation. We disagree. "[T]he word 'association' is a broad term which may be used to includea wide assortment of differing organizational structures" (Mohonk Trust v Board of Assessorsof Town of Gardiner, 47 NY2d 476, 482-483 [1979]). An unincorporated association hasbeen broadly defined as a "voluntary congregate entit[y]" (Community Bd. 7 of Borough ofManhattan v Schaffer, 84 NY2d 148, 155 [1994]). Here, defendant undeniably exercisessignificant control over the Chapter, which operates under defendant's oversight and supervisionpursuant to defendant's bylaws, chapter manual (hereinafter the manual), policies, and otherdocuments governing the parties' relationship. The manual defines a chapter as "the basicorganizational unit of [defendant], responsible within its territory for carrying out [defendant's]activities." The governing documents provide, among other things, that defendant's chapters mustoperate in accord with defendant's bylaws, rules and policies, that the powers granted to achapter's board of directors are subject to defendant's rules, and that defendant's bylaws govern inany matter not specifically covered by a chapter's bylaws or in the event of any conflict.However, these documents also grant considerable local autonomy to each chapter. Among otherthings, the Chapter elects its own officers and board of directors, has its own federal employeridentification number, state operating licenses and tax exempt status,[FN1]files its own fiscal reports and tax returns, maintains its own bank accounts, hires, trains and paysits own employees, and operates its own programs and purchases real property from its ownrevenues, independent of any financial contribution from defendant. Moreover, other chapters ofdefendant have commenced litigation in their own right, including litigation against defendant(see e.g. Resource Ctr. v NYSARC,Inc., 74 AD3d 1750, 1750 [2010]; New York Assn. for Retarded Children,Montgomery County Ch. v Keator, 199 AD2d 921, 922 [1993]).[FN2]Given these markers of [*3]autonomy, we find that the Chapterhas sufficient separate existence to be considered an unincorporated association such thatplaintiff, as its president, had capacity to commence this action (see General AssociationsLaw § 12; CPLR 1025; Community Bd. 7 of Borough of Manhattan v Schaffer, 84NY2d at 155; Matter of Stephentown Concerned Citizens v Herrick, 223 AD2d 862, 864n 2 [1996], lv dismissed and denied 96 NY2d 881 [2001]; see also Kirkman vWestchester Newspapers, Inc., 287 NY 373, 379-381 [1942]).
In view of this determination, plaintiff asks that we address the substantive issues raised inthe parties' motions regarding the Chapter's ability to sever its relationship with defendant and theconsequences of such a severance. In the interest of judicial economy, we will exercise ourauthority to search the record and, insofar as possible, address the merits of the parties' respectivesummary judgment motions (see Nelsonv Sweet Assoc., Inc., 15 AD3d 714, 716 n [2005]; Mazzocki v State Farm Fire & Cas. Corp., 1 AD3d 9, 12 [2003]).Initially, plaintiff contends that as an unincorporated association, it can, among other things,"disaffiliate" from defendant, reorganize as a corporation, and continue its activities withoutinvoking provisions in the governing documents that control the dissolution of a chapter. Ourdetermination that the Chapter is an unincorporated association for purposes of its capacity to suedoes not mandate this conclusion; the issue is determined by the bylaws and other governingdocuments, which constitute the contract defining the privileges and duties assumed by theparties (see Polin v Kaplan, 257 NY 277, 281 [1931]; Matter of Desir v Spano,259 AD2d 749, 749-750 [1999]; see also Matter of Willard Alexander, Inc. [Glasser], 31NY2d 270, 273 [1972], cert denied 410 US 983 [1973]). Defendant requires its chaptersto adopt model bylaws set forth in the manual, without modification or amendment, except asapproved by defendant's board of governors. The Chapter's bylaws require it to "act locally for[defendant] . . . in conformity with [the manual] and such rules, regulations andpolicies as [defendant] may from time to time prescribe," and defendant's bylaws provide, in turn,that its chapters are required to function under the manual. These documents plainly establishthat the Chapter's organization as such is governed by defendant and, thus, that the Chapter mustabide by defendant's manual, bylaws and rules so long as it retains its status as a chapter.
We find no support within these documents for plaintiff's theory that the Chapter can severits relationship with defendant by "disaffiliating" rather than by dissolving as a chapter. Noprovisions pertaining to disaffiliation appear in the manual or elsewhere in the governingdocuments. The termination of a chapter's status as such is addressed in a section of the manualentitled "Dissolving a Chapter." This provision states, among other things, that "[surrender] of [achapter's] Certificate of Recognition is a voluntary dissolution of [the] [c]hapter by its members"and that a chapter's certificate may also be withdrawn by defendant's board ofgovernors.[FN3]The provision further states that upon the dissolution of a chapter, defendant may take over the[*4]chapter's former operations and activities and conductmeetings of the former chapter's members, whose status as members of defendant is unaffectedby the chapter's dissolution. Under these provisions, any severance by the Chapter of itsrelationship with defendant must constitute a dissolution, even if its members continue operatingas a group thereafter, since it would necessarily result in the loss of defendant's recognition of thechapter (see Resource Ctr. v NYSARC, Inc., 74 AD3d at 1751). Accordingly, defendantis entitled to partial summary judgment insofar as it seeks a determination that the Chapter's planto sever its relationship with defendant is governed by the manual's provisions pertaining todissolution.
These provisions do not, however, permit a complete determination of the consequences sucha severance may have on the Chapter's property and assets.[FN4]We find no authority in the governing documents for the Chapter's demand that, upon itsreorganization, defendant should be directed to convey all of its former assets to the newlyformed corporation�but we also disagree with defendant's contention that the manualaffirmatively requires the Chapter, if it dissolves, to surrender all of its property to defendant.The plain language of the subject provision places no obligations on the dissolving chapter or itsmembers, but instead imposes limitations on defendant's use of any property "coming into [its]possession" upon the dissolution of a chapter by requiring defendant to use the property onlywithin that chapter's "territory or sphere of activity."
Nevertheless, the Chapter's ability to own and control property is strictly limited by otherprovisions in the governing documents. A provision of the manual entitled "Finance" states, inpart, that "[a]ll funds and property given to or received by any [c]hapter shall belong to and betrust funds and property of [defendant], to be held for the beneficial use of people with mentalretardation or other developmental disabilities in the area or sphere of activity of the [c]hapter."As to real property, the manual requires defendant's chapters to take title either as a chapter ofdefendant or, at the chapter's option, in the name of a holding company. Where property is titledin the name of a chapter of defendant, the manual provides that defendant must hold the property"for the beneficial use of the [c]hapter . . . unless the [c]hapter ceases to exist." Inour view, the only reasonable interpretation of this provision is that property titled in this fashionis owned by defendant and that the Chapter is entitled to its beneficial use only so long as itretains its status as a chapter.[FN5]
However, not all of the Chapter's property is titled to defendant. The record indicates [*5]that the Chapter has also exercised its option to title some of its realproperty to its holding company. The manual provides chapters with a vehicle for separate localownership of real property by authorizing them to form holding companies to take title to realproperty and establishes general requirements for the organization and operation of thesecorporations; however, it includes no provisions establishing the effect of a chapter's dissolutionon its holding company or on property titled to the holding company. Nor does the record includethe organizational documents of the Chapter's holding company, or other extrinsic evidence thatmight permit such a determination. The record is similarly inadequate with regard to any otherfunds, property or business assets that the Chapter may currently hold. Accordingly, this mattermust be remitted to Supreme Court to determine the remaining questions in the action, includingthe effect that the Chapter's severance of its relationship with defendant, if it occurs, will have onownership of real property titled to the Chapter's holding company, and any other personalproperty, funds or assets that may be currently owned or managed by the Chapter.
Mercure, J.P., Rose, Malone Jr. and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order ismodified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as partially granted defendant'smotion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff lackedcapacity to sue; said motion denied to that extent, plaintiff's motion for summary judgmentgranted to the extent of declaring that plaintiff has capacity to commence this action, defendant'smotion granted to the extent of declaring that the Chenango County Chapter of NYSARC, Inc. isrequired to abide by defendant's chapter manual, bylaws and other policies in the event that itwithdraws from its status as a chapter of defendant, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court forfurther proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.[Prior Case History: 29 Misc 3d 559.]
Footnote 1: Before acquiring separate taxexempt status, the Chapter enjoyed that status under defendant's group tax exempt ruling.
Footnote 2: Plaintiff submits an affidavitfrom a previous federal court action, in which defendant took the position that its chapters hadsufficient independence as separate entities to be sued, and thus that an action commencedagainst defendant by a chapter employee should have been commenced solely against the chapterinstead. However, contrary to plaintiff's claim, defendant's prior position does not preclude itfrom arguing that plaintiff lacks capacity to sue in this action, as the record does not reveal thatdefendant obtained relief by asserting this position in the prior matter (see Matter of Stewart v Chautauqua CountyBd. of Elections, 14 NY3d 139, 149-150 [2010]).
Footnote 3: The manual provides thatdefendant issue a certificate of recognition as the final step in its approval of the formation of anew chapter, in order to acknowledge the new chapter's "entity as a [c]hapter of [defendant]."
Footnote 4: Contrary to defendant's claim,this determination is not governed by the provision in N-PCL 516 (a) that "the interest of amember in the property of a corporation shall terminate upon the termination of his [or her]membership," because defendant's bylaws and manual provide unambiguously that only"individuals" may be members of defendant and, further, that dissolution of a chapter does notaffect membership in defendant. No provision is made for membership by chapters or otherorganizational entities.
Footnote 5: An unincorporated associationhas no power to own or acquire real property in its own right (see Schein v Erasmus RealtyCo., Inc., 194 App Div 38, 40 [1920]; 2-23 Warren's Weed, New York Real Property §23.09 [2011]).