| Ricketts v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 07495 [88 AD3d 593] |
| October 25, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Joseph Ricketts, Petitioner, v New York City Health andHospitals Corporation et al., Respondents. |
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Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Andrew S. Wellin of counsel), forrespondents.
Determination of respondent New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC), datedJuly 27, 2009, terminating petitioner's employment, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied,and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order ofSupreme Court, New York County [Saliann Scarpulla, J.], entered July 29, 2010), dismissed,without costs.
Substantial evidence, including the parties' stipulation and the testimony of petitioner'ssupervisor, supports HHC's determination that petitioner engaged in misconduct consisting ofexcessive absences, absence without official leave (AWOL), and failure to follow HHC's call-inpolicy (see Matter of Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436, 443 [1987]).
We decline to review petitioner's argument that the determination violated the New YorkCity Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1] [a]), since henever raised it before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) (see Matter of Colton vRiccobono, 67 NY2d 571, 575 [1986]). Were we to review it, we would reject it. Thedetermination did not violate the New York City Human Rights Law, the New York StateHuman Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; [3] [a]), the Americans with DisabilitiesAct (42 USC § 12112 [a]), or HHC's own policies. The ALJ did not credit petitioner'suncorroborated testimony that his alleged misconduct was due to his disability—namely,diabetes. The ALJ found that the medical note petitioner submitted did not support his claim. TheALJ also found that, before his absences, petitioner never requested or proposed a reasonableaccommodation for his disability (seePimentel v Citibank, N.A., 29 AD3d 141, 148 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 707[2006]). There is no basis for disturbing the ALJ's findings and credibility determinations (seeBerenhaus, 70 NY2d at 443; cf. Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554 [1994]).
Because petitioner was terminated based on "misconduct shown after a hearing upon statedcharges" (Civil Service Law § 75 [1]), the determination did not violate Civil Service Law§ 75. Disciplinary sanctions may be imposed pursuant to the statute even if petitioner's actsof misconduct were not shown to be willful or intentional (see Matter of Brockman vSkidmore, 39 [*2]NY2d 1045, 1046 [1976]; Matter ofMoorehead v New York City Tr. Auth., 190 AD2d 674, 675 [1993]).
The determination did not violate the notice requirement of the Family and Medical LeaveAct (FMLA) (29 USC § 2619 [a]). The ALJ did not credit petitioner's uncorroboratedtestimony that HHC failed to post a notice mandated by the FMLA, and there is no basis fordisturbing that credibility determination (Berenhaus, 70 NY2d at 443).
The ALJ properly considered petitioner's prior disciplinary record only in the penalty phaseof the proceeding (see Matter of Marcondes v Ward, 172 AD2d 318, 319 [1991]). Theparties' November 2007 stipulation, which resolved prior disciplinary proceedings againstpetitioner, was properly admitted to impeach petitioner's testimony. The stipulation provided thatit would be admissible in subsequent disciplinary proceedings involving AWOL charges, andpetitioner is charged with notice of its attachments. The stipulation also provided that where, ashere, petitioner is charged with misconduct involving being AWOL and the charges aresustained, the only penalty that can be imposed is termination.
We have considered petitioner's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.Concur—Tom, J.P., Saxe, Moskowitz, DeGrasse and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.