| Matter of Miller v Fedorka |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 07539 [88 AD3d 1185] |
| October 27, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Mark B. Miller, Appellant, v Chivon K.Fedorka, Also Known as Chivon K. VanNest, Respondent. |
—[*1] Samantha H. Miller, Schenectady, attorney for the child.
Malone Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Fulton County (Skoda, J.),entered June 9, 2010, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to FamilyCt Act article 6, for visitation with the parties' child.
Petitioner (hereinafter the father), a prison inmate, commenced this proceeding againstrespondent (hereinafter the mother) seeking regular visitation with the parties' child (born in2007) at the correctional facility in which he is confined. Following a hearing, Family Courtgranted the father visitation with the child twice per year at the correctional facility, which is anine-hour round trip by car from the child's home, ordered the mother to send him onephotograph of the child each month, and permitted the father to send the child one letter permonth. The father appeals, contending that the court should have awarded him more frequentvisitation and should not have restricted his correspondence with the child.
"The propriety of visitation is left to the sound discretion of Family Court and its findings,guided by the best interests of the child, will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound basis inthe record" (Matter of Moore vSchill, 44 AD3d 1123, 1123 [2007] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Garraway v Laforet, 68AD3d 1192, 1193-1194 [2009]). The record here reflects that, in awarding the father twovisits per year, Family Court considered, among other things, the [*2]child's young age, the nature of his existing relationship with thefather, the lengthy distance to the correctional facility and the cost and logistics involved intransporting the child for visitation. Given the circumstances presented here, we find no reason todisturb Family Court's determination with respect to visitation (see Matter of Baker v Blanchard, 74AD3d 1427, 1428-1429 [2010]; Matter of Moore v Schill, 44 AD3d at 1123). Nor dowe find any reason to disturb the court's restriction of the amount of written correspondence thatthe father is permitted to send to the child, particularly considering that the child is young and notyet able to read.
Finally, as he acknowledges, the father did not request at the hearing that Family Court awardhim telephone communication with the child and, thus, his claim for such is not properly beforethis Court.
Mercure, J.P., Spain, Kavanagh and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order isaffirmed, without costs, and without prejudice to a subsequent application by petitioner to modifythe restriction on his written communication with the child when the child is able to read.