| People v Ramdass |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 07660 [88 AD3d 1019] |
| October 25, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Devendra Ramdass, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Seth M.Lieberman of counsel; Tiffany L. Henry on the brief), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a resentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County (D'Emic, J.),imposed March 12, 2010, upon his conviction of attempted murder in the second degree andcriminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty.
Ordered that the resentence is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interestof justice, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for resentencing inaccordance herewith.
On the defendant's previous appeal, we reversed the sentence imposed on the ground that thesentencing court "several times expressed the erroneous belief that it was bound by the promisemade by the justice who presided over the plea proceeding" (People v Ramdass, 68 AD3d 1139, 1140 [2009]), and we remittedthe matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for resentencing (id. at 1140). We notedthat the court was required to determine an appropriate sentence in light of "all [of] thecircumstances" (id.). On remittal, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it retaineddiscretion to impose the sentence that it deemed appropriate, but stated that the Justice whopresided over the plea proceeding "knew the case best" and that there was no "compelling"reason to depart from that Justice's promise. These statements do not satisfy us that the SupremeCourt fully appreciated the extent of its obligation and discretion. It is the sentencing court that isin the best position to choose an appropriate sentence, because only that court has the benefit of,among other things, the presentence report and the statements of the People, the victim, defensecounsel, and the defendant (see CPL 380.50). As the original Justice recognized at theplea proceeding, when he stated that he expected the victim to make a statement at sentencing,his sentencing promise necessarily was preliminary. Therefore, we reverse the resentence andagain remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, so that it may impose an appropriatesentence after consideration of all of the relevant circumstances (see People v Farrar, 52NY2d 302, 305-306 [1981]; People v Dorino, 145 AD2d 432, 433 [1988]). We declinethe defendant's request that we remit the case to a different Justice, and we do not express anyview as to the appropriateness of any particular sentence.
In light of our determination, the defendant's remaining contention has been renderedacademic. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Eng and Cohen, JJ., concur.