| People v Moore |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 07864 [89 AD3d 769] |
| November 1, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Diquawn Moore, Appellant. |
—[*1] Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Laurie K. Gibbons and Kathleen M.Egan of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Berkowitz,J.), rendered May 10, 2010, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree and criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt of manslaughter in the first degree (see Penal Law § 125.20 [1])beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5),we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633[2006]). The defendant's intent to cause serious physical injury (see Penal Law §10.00 [10]) may be inferred from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances (see Peoplev Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]; People v Ramos, 80 AD3d 716, 716 [2011], lv granted 17NY3d 799 [2011]; People vSpurgeon, 63 AD3d 863, 864 [2009]; see also People v Gill, 20 AD3d 434, 434-435 [2005]; People vVella, 247 AD2d 642, 643 [1998]).
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in permitting a detective to testify regardingstatements he heard the defendant make to another detective, who also testified at trial as to thedefendant's statements. The defendant's contentions that this challenged testimony constitutedinadmissible hearsay and improper bolstering are unpreserved for appellate review, as thedefendant never objected to the testimony on these grounds (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bryan, 50 AD3d 1049,1050 [2008]; People v Cruz, 31AD3d 660, 661 [2006]; People vNanton, 18 AD3d 671, 672 [2005]; People v Victor, 271 AD2d 556, 557[2000]). In any event, the challenged testimony was properly admitted under the exception to thehearsay rule for party admissions (see People v Johnson, 93 NY2d 254, 260 [1999]; People v Valdes, 66 AD3d 925,926 [2009]; People v Nealy, 32AD3d 400, 402 [2006]), and did not constitute improper bolstering (see People v Spicola, 16 NY3d441, 452-453 [2011], cert denied 565 US —, 132 S Ct 400 [2011]; Peoplev Buie, 86 NY2d 501, 510-511 [1995]).[*2]
The defendant's contention that the sentence imposed bythe Supreme Court improperly penalized him for exercising his right to a jury trial is withoutmerit (see People v Tannis, 36AD3d 635 [2007]; People v Best, 295 AD2d 441, 441-442 [2002]; People vRobinson, 287 AD2d 582, 582-583 [2001]). Further, the sentence imposed was not excessive(see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Prudenti, P.J., Skelos, Balkin and Sgroi, JJ.,concur.