| Fisher v Flanigan |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 07963 [89 AD3d 1398] |
| November 10, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Carl L. Fisher, as Power of Attorney for John C. Fisher,Respondent-Appellant, v Kenneth Flanigan et al., Defendants, and Damon Corporation,Appellant-Respondent. |
—[*1] Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, Buffalo (John A. Collins of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent-appellant.
Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Gerald J. Whalen, J.),entered July 13, 2010 in a personal injury action. The order, among other things, granted in part anddenied in part the motion of defendant Damon Corporation for summary judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by grantingthe motion of defendant Damon Corporation in its entirety and dismissing the amended complaint andcross claim against it and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff, as power of attorney for John C. Fisher (Fisher), commenced this actionalleging, inter alia, that defendant Damon Corporation (Damon) is liable for the injuries sustained byFisher when he fell while he was walking in a motor home manufactured by Damon. The motor homewas in motion at the time of the fall, and was being driven by defendant Kenneth Flanigan. Damonmoved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint and all cross claims against it.Supreme Court denied that part of the motion with respect to the strict products liability cause of actionfor failure to warn passengers to remain seated and granted that part of the motion with respect to thedesign defect cause of action. We note that, although the court did not address that part of the motionwith respect to the cross claim for contribution or indemnification, the failure to rule on that part of themotion is deemed a denial thereof (see Brown v U.S. Vanadium Corp., 198 AD2d 863[1993]). This appeal by Damon and cross appeal by plaintiff ensued. We agree with Damon that thecourt should have granted the motion in its entirety, and we therefore modify the order accordingly.
With respect to the strict products liability cause of action for failure to warn, we conclude thatDamon established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and that plaintiff failed to raise an issueof fact sufficient to defeat the motion (see generally Zuckerman v City of [*2]New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). It is well established that"[a] manufacturer . . . has a duty to warn of the danger of unintended uses of a productprovided these uses are reasonably foreseeable" (Liriano v Hobart Corp., 92 NY2d 232, 237[1998]). However, "in appropriate cases, courts could as a matter of law decide that a manufacturer'swarning would have been superfluous given an injured party's actual knowledge of the specific hazardthat caused the injury" (id. at 241). Here, Damon established that the risk of falling whilemoving about in a moving vehicle is open and obvious. Although the issue whether a particular risk isopen and obvious is "most often a jury question[,] . . . [w]here only one conclusion can bedrawn from the established facts, . . . the issue of whether the risk was open and obviousmay be determined by the court as a matter of law" (id. at 242). Fisher testified at hisdeposition that he had experience traveling in a bus and subway and knew that there was a risk offalling while the bus and subway were in motion. We thus further conclude that Damon established that"a warning would have added nothing to [Fisher's] appreciation of the danger," thereby obviating therequirement of a duty to warn (id.). Neither Fisher's affidavit in opposition to the motion nor theexpert affidavits raised an issue of fact sufficient to defeat the motion. Although Fisher stated in hisopposing affidavit that he thought it was "customary and acceptable to move about" a motor home andthat he would not have done so had there been a warning does not negate his acknowledgment of theopen and obvious danger of standing in a moving vehicle set forth in his deposition testimony. One ofplaintiff's experts does not dispute that the risk of falling in a motor vehicle is open and obvious, but heinstead asserts that a warning against the open and obvious risk was necessary because the "visual cuespromote a sense of safety." Plaintiff's second expert makes only a conclusory statement that Damonshould have provided notices to passengers not to leave their seats if that was Damon's intention whilethe motor home was in motion.
With respect to the design defect cause of action, we note that, "[w]hile the focus of adesign-defect claim . . . is the product's fitness for intended uses . . ., the focus of a failure to warn claim . . . is whether there has been a breach of themanufacturer's duty to warn consumers against using the product for unintended but foreseeablepurposes" (Amatulli v Delhi Constr. Corp., 77 NY2d 525, 537 [1991, Titone, J., dissenting inpart and concurring in part]). We conclude that Damon established as a matter of law that the motorhome was designed so that it was reasonably safe for its intended use. "[T]he validity of a design-defectclaim should be assessed by reference to the configuration of the product 'as of the time [it] leaves themanufacturer's hands' " (id.; seegenerally Adams v Genie Indus., Inc., 14 NY3d 535, 542 [2010]). According to thedeposition testimony of Damon's employees, certain seats were equipped with seat belts inconformance with federal regulations and the motor home complied with all applicable regulations andindustry standards when it was manufactured in 1998. Further, the owner's manual advised the ownerthat passengers should remain seated and restrained by a seat belt while the motor home was in motion.Damon further established that the alleged safety devices proposed by plaintiff's experts, i.e., devices tograsp when standing or walking and an auditory system warning that the vehicle is changing speed ordirection, are not provided for in the regulations or industry standards and have not been used in themotor home industry from 1998 through the present time. We conclude that plaintiff failed to raise anissue of fact whether the motor home was reasonably safe for its intended use (see generallyZuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562). Instead, each of plaintiff's experts merely expressed the conclusoryopinion that, because Damon was aware that passengers might not remain seated while the vehicle wasin motion, safety devices should have been installed.
Finally, in view of our determination with respect to the amended complaint against Damon, wefurther conclude that Damon's motion with respect to the cross claim should have been granted as well.Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Centra, Green and Gorski, JJ.