| Matter of Richard M. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 08154 [89 AD3d 849] |
| November 9, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Richard M., Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Edward F.X. Hart and DrakeA. Colley of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Richard M.appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), datedFebruary 28, 2011, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated January 21, 2011,made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would haveconstituted the crimes of burglary in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree,criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, and criminal trespass in the thirddegree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him in the custody of the New YorkState Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 18 months. The appeal from theorder of disposition brings up for review the fact-finding order.
Ordered that the order of disposition is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisionthereof adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent based upon the finding that he committedan act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal trespass inthe third degree, and substituting therefor a provision dismissing that count of the petition; as somodified, the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and thefact-finding order is modified accordingly.
The appellant contends that the expert witness in fingerprint comparison and identificationdid not give adequate factual detail to support his conclusion that three latent fingerprints left atthe scene of the burglary matched known fingerprints of the appellant. Contrary [*2]to the appellant's contention, the opinion of the expert witness wassupported by a sufficient factual basis establishing that an accepted methodology wasappropriately employed (see People v Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 [1989]; People vGarcia, 299 AD2d 493 [2002]; seegenerally Parker v Mobil Oil Corp., 7 NY3d 434, 447 [2006]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matterof David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621[1983]), we find that there was legally sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant committedacts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of burglary in the seconddegree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in thefourth degree (cf. People vUrquidez, 5 AD3d 800, 801 [2004]; People v Hirsch, 280 AD2d 612 [2001];People v Murray, 168 AD2d 573, 573 [1990]). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibilityto conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Michale A.C., 73 AD3d1042, 1043 [2010]; cf. CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accordgreat deference to the opportunity of the finder of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony,and observe demeanor (see Matter ofHasan C., 59 AD3d 617, 617-618 [2009]; cf. People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410[2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]). Upon our review of the record, we are satisfied that the Family Court's determination isnot against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; cf. People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633[2006]).
Criminal trespass in the third degree (see Penal Law § 140.10 [a]) is alesser-included offense of burglary in the second degree (see Penal Law § 140.25[2]; Matter of Jay R., 255 AD2d 134 [1998]). Accordingly, the count of the petitioncharging criminal trespass in the third degree should have been dismissed (see CPL300.40 [3] [b]; Matter of Jaleel H.,36 AD3d 808, 809-810 [2007]). Angiolillo, J.P., Florio, Leventhal and Cohen, JJ., concur.