Edouazin v Champlain
2011 NY Slip Op 08323 [89 AD3d 892]
November 15, 2011
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 4th, 2012


Francois Edouazin, Appellant,
v
Theodore Champlain et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Brian P. Neary, P.C., Huntington, N.Y., for appellant.

Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, New York, N.Y. (Michael Gallagher and JohnT. Cofresi of counsel), for respondents Theodore Champlain and Ryder Truck Rental.

Hammill, O'Brien, Croutier, Dempsey, Pender & Koehler, P.C., Syosset, N.Y. (Anton Piotroskiof counsel), for respondents Terrence Watts and Cove Plumbing Supply, Inc.

Cascone & Kluepfel, LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Rendon P. Sangalang of counsel), for respondentsJames C. Malico and JPM Trucking, Inc.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals (1), as limitedby his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Molia, J.), enteredSeptember 9, 2010, as granted the cross motion of the defendants James C. Malico and JPMTrucking, Inc., for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on theground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law §5102 (d), denied, as academic, the alternative branch of his motion which was for summary judgmenton the issue of liability against the defendants James C. Malico and JPM Trucking, Inc., and grantedthose branches of the separate cross motions of the defendants Terrence Watts II and Cove PlumbingSupply, Inc., and the defendants Theodore Champlain and Ryder Truck Rental, which were forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them on the ground thatthe plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and(2) from a judgment of the same court entered September 24, 2010, which, upon the order, is in favorof the defendants Terrence Watts II and Cove Plumbing Supply, Inc., dismissing the complaint insofaras asserted against them.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of the cross motion ofthe defendants Terrence Watts II and Cove Plumbing Supply, Inc., which was for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain aserious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) is dismissed; and it is further,[*2]

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as reviewed, on thelaw, the cross motion of the defendants James C. Malico and JPM Trucking, Inc., and those branchesof the separate cross motion of the defendants Theodore Champlain and Ryder Truck Rental, whichwere for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them on theground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law §5102 (d) are denied; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and that branch of the cross motion of thedefendants Terrence Watts II and Cove Plumbing Supply, Inc., which was for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain aserious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) is denied, and the order enteredSeptember 9, 2010, is modified accordingly; and it is further,

Ordered that the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to determine thealternative branch of the plaintiff's motion, that branch of the separate cross motion of the defendantsTheodore Champlain and Ryder Truck Rental which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability,on the merits, and that branch of the cross motion of the defendants Terrence Watts II and CovePlumbing Supply, Inc., which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability, on the merits; and it isfurther,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff payable by the defendants James C.Malico and JPM Trucking, Inc., the defendants Terrence Watts II and Cove Plumbing Supply, Inc.,and the defendants Theodore Champlain and Ryder Truck Rental.

The appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of the cross motion of the defendantsTerrence Watts II and Cove Plumbing Supply, Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injurywithin the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) must be dismissed, as the right of direct appealfrom that part of the order terminated with the entry of the judgment entered September 24, 2010(see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from thatportion of the order have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501[a]).

All of the defendants, in support of those branches of their respective cross motions which were forsummary judgment on the issue of serious injury, relied upon, inter alia, the affirmed medical report ofDr. Robert Pearl, their expert neurologist. This report failed to eliminate a triable issue of fact, therebypreventing the defendants from meeting their prima facie burdens. Dr. Pearl examined the plaintiff onAugust 12, 2009, nearly three years post-accident. During his examination of the plaintiff, he notedsignificant limitations in the ranges of motion of the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine (see Grisales v City of New York, 85 AD3d964 [2011]; Torres v Torrano, 79AD3d 1124 [2010]; Mondevil vKumar, 74 AD3d 1295 [2010]).

While the defendants also relied on the affirmed medical report of Dr. Scott S. Coyne, theirradiology expert, his report was also insufficient to enable the defendants to meet their prima facieburdens in this case. The plaintiff, in his bill of particulars, alleged exacerbations of preexisting injuries tothe cervical and lumbar regions of his spine. While it is true that Dr. Coyne opined that the pathology heobserved in the plaintiff's December 2006 MRI films was degenerative in nature and unrelated to thesubject accident, the defendants failed to show that the limitations noted by Dr. Pearl were the result ofa prior accident, rather than from exacerbations caused by the subject one (see Pero v Transervice Logistics, Inc., 83AD3d 681, 682-683 [2011]; Rabinowitz v Kahl, 78 AD3d 678 [2010]; Washington v Asdotel Enters., Inc., 66AD3d 880 [2009]; McKenzie vRedl, 47 AD3d 775, 776 [2008]).

Since the defendants failed to meet their respective prima facie burdens of showing that the plaintiffdid not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), this Court neednot determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise atriable issue of fact (see Grisales v City of New York, 85 AD3d at 965; Pero vTranservice Logistics, Inc., 83 AD3d at 683; Coscia v 938 Trading Corp., 283 AD2d538 [2001]).[*3]

In light of our determination, the matter must be remitted to theSupreme Court, Suffolk County, to determine the alternative branch of the plaintiff's motion, and thosebranches of the cross motions of the defendants Theodore Champlain and Ryder Truck Rental, and thedefendants Terrence Watts II and Cove Plumbing Supply, Inc., which were for summary judgment onthe issue of liability, on the merits (seeAlvarez v Dematas, 65 AD3d 598, 600 [2009]). Rivera, J.P., Angiolillo, Belen and Roman,JJ., concur.


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