Friia v Palumbo
2011 NY Slip Op 08325 [89 AD3d 896]
November 15, 2011
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 4th, 2012


L. Victoria Friia, Respondent,
v
Steven Palumbo,Appellant.

—[*1]Sanders & Solomon, P.C., Melville, N.Y. (Michael B. Solomon of counsel), for appellant.

Horn & Horn, Huntington, N.Y. (Jeffrey S. Horn and Lori A. McNeely of counsel), forrespondent.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for conversion, the defendant appeals from so much ofan order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gazzillo, J.), dated January 19, 2011, as denied hismotion to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise ofdiscretion, with costs, and the defendant's motion to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel is granted.

"A party's entitlement to be represented in ongoing litigation by counsel of its choice is a valuedright" (Hudson Val. Mar., Inc. v Town ofCortlandt, 54 AD3d 999, 1000 [2008]; see S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777S. H. Corp., 69 NY2d 437, 440 [1987]; Wolfson v Posner, 57 AD3d 979, 980 [2008]). Nevertheless, pursuantto rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0), unless certain exceptions apply,"[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate before a tribunal in a matter in which the lawyer is likely to be awitness on a significant issue of fact" (Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 3.7 [a];see Falk v Gallo, 73 AD3d 685,686 [2010]; see also S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp., 69 NY2d at445-446).

The plaintiff contended that she contributed substantially all of the funds on deposit in certain jointbank accounts held by the parties, such that the defendant's conduct in withdrawing a large portion ofthose funds constituted conversion. The defendant contended that one of those bank accountscontained his separate funds, which he had transferred into the plaintiff's name on the advice of theplaintiff's present counsel at a time when he was a defendant in an unrelated personal injury action. Theplaintiff, who was present when the defendant consulted with her attorney regarding the personal injuryaction, denies that any such advice was given. Since the origin of the funds in the joint accounts is asignificant factual issue in the case, and because the plaintiff's counsel is the "only person, other than theparties, who had knowledge of" the advice he gave to the defendant regarding a portion of those funds,and is in a position to corroborate the testimony of one of the parties, he is "likely to be a witness on asignificant issue of fact" (Falk v Gallo, 73 AD3d at [*2]686[internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised itsdiscretion in denying the defendant's motion to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel (id.; see Kattas v Sherman, 32 AD3d 496,497 [2006]; Bridges v Alcan Constr. Corp., 134 AD2d 316, 317 [1987]).

In light of our determination, we need not reach the parties' remaining contentions. Prudenti, P.J.,Skelos, Balkin and Sgroi, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2011 NY Slip Op 30258(U).]


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