O'Brien v Bainbridge
2011 NY Slip Op 08401 [89 AD3d 1511]
November 18, 2011
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 4th, 2012


Colleen O'Brien, Respondent-Appellant, v Larry J. Bainbridge et al.,Appellants-Respondents. (Appeal No. 2.)

—[*1]Burden, Gulisano & Hickey, LLC, Buffalo (Sarah Hansen of counsel), fordefendants-appellants-respondents.

Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, Buffalo (John A. Collins of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent-appellant.

Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Timothy J. Drury, J.),entered November 22, 2010 in a personal injury action. The order granted the motion of defendants forleave to reargue and, upon reargument, granted in part the motion of defendants for summary judgment.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by grantingthat part of defendants' motion with respect to the 90/180-day category of serious injury within themeaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) and dismissing the complaint, as amplified by the amendedbill of particulars, to that further extent and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she sustained when theUnited States Postal Service vehicle she was driving was broadsided at an intersection in the City ofBuffalo by a delivery truck owned and operated by defendant Larry J. Bainbridge pursuant to acontract for package delivery with defendant FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. In appeal No. 1,defendants appeal and plaintiff cross-appeals from an order denying defendants' motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within themeaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) and denying plaintiff's cross motion for partial summaryjudgment on the issue of serious injury. We note at the outset that, in her original bill of particulars,plaintiff alleged that she sustained four categories of serious injury, i.e, the significant disfigurement,permanent loss of use, significant limitation of use and 90/180-day categories. In her amended bill ofparticulars, however, which predates Supreme Court's decision in appeal No. 1, plaintiff added thecategory of permanent consequential limitation of use. In its written decision underlying the order inappeal No. 1, the court addressed only the initial four categories in denying defendants' motion, but didnot address the additional fifth category. Thus, the permanent loss of use category remained intactdespite the court's failure to address it expressly in the order, inasmuch as the decision controls theorder in the case of a discrepancy between the two (see generally Matter of Edward V., 204AD2d 1060 [1994]), and neither party challenges the court's ruling with respect to that category.[*2]

In appeal No. 2, defendants appeal and plaintiff cross-appealsfrom an order granting defendants' motion for leave to reargue and, upon reargument, granting thoseparts of defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, as amplified by theamended bill of particulars, with respect to the permanent consequential limitation of use and thesignificant limitation of use categories of serious injury. The court denied the motion with respect to thethree remaining categories of serious injury allegedly sustained by plaintiff, but the court expresslyaddressed only two of those categories, i.e., the significant disfigurement and the 90/180-daycategories. We note at the outset that appeal No. 1 must be dismissed insofar as the order thereinaddresses defendants' motion, because such order was superseded by the order in appeal No. 2 withrespect defendants' motion (see Loafin' Tree Rest. v Pardi [appeal No. 1], 162 AD2d 985[1990]). We further note that plaintiff in appeal No. 2 did not seek leave to reargue her cross motion inappeal No. 1.

With respect to appeal No. 2, we conclude that the court properly granted those parts ofdefendants' motion with respect to the permanent consequential limitation of use and the significantlimitation of use categories of serious injury. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, defendants met their initialburden on the motion with respect to those categories, and plaintiff failed to submit the requisiteobjective evidence of plaintiff's alleged injury "to satisfy the statutory serious injury threshold"(Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345, 350 [2002]). The evidence submitted byplaintiff consisted primarily of subjective complaints of pain, which are insufficient to satisfy the statutorythreshold (see Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 957-958 [1992]). Although plaintiff alsosubmitted some physician findings of loss of range of motion, it is well settled that "a finding of reducedrange of motion alone is insufficient to support a finding of serious injury because such adetermination is based on subjective complaints of pain, [and this record is otherwise] devoid of anyindependent objective medical evidence of a serious injury" (Durham v New York E. Travel, 2 AD3d 1113, 1115 [2003]; see Parreno v Jumbo Trucking, Inc., 40AD3d 520, 523-524 [2007]). Moreover, we agree with defendants in appeal No. 2 that the courterred in denying that part of their motion with respect to the 90/180-day category inasmuch as there isno "objective evidence of a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature" (Zeigler v Ramadhan, 5 AD3d 1080,1081 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]). We therefore modify the order in appeal No. 2accordingly.

Finally, with respect to the significant disfigurement category of serious injury based upon the scarson plaintiff's leg, we conclude that the issue whether " 'a reasonable person viewing the plaintiff's [leg] inits altered state would regard the condition as unattractive, objectionable or as the subject of pity orscorn' " presents an issue of fact that cannot be resolved by way of summary judgment (Waldron vWild, 96 AD2d 190, 194 [1983]; see Savage v Delacruz, 100 AD2d 707, 707-708[1984]). Thus, the issue of whether plaintiff's scars constitute a significant disfigurement should bedecided by the trier of fact, along with the remaining category of permanent loss of use.Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Fahey, Peradotto and Lindley, JJ.


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