| Al-Shahrani v Hudson Auto Traders, Inc. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 08546 [89 AD3d 968] |
| November 22, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Rayon Al-Shahrani, Appellant, v Hudson Auto Traders, Inc.,Respondent. |
—[*1] The Kitson Law Firm, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (James R. Carcano of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action, in effect, to rescind a contract and to recover damages related to the contract, theplaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Nicolai, J.), dated October28, 2010, which, upon the granting of the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at theclose of the plaintiff's case, for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, is in favor of thedefendant and against him, dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion pursuant to CPLR 4401for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint is denied, the complaint is reinstated, and thematter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Putnam County, for a new trial.
"A motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401 may be granted only when thetrial court determines that, upon the evidence presented, 'there is no rational process by which the facttrier could base a finding in favor of the nonmoving party' " (Hoberg v Shree Granesh, LLC, 85 AD3d 965, 966 [2011], quotingSzczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]). "In making this evaluation, 'the trial court mustafford the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawn from the factspresented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant' " (Hoberg vShree Granesh, LLC, 85 AD3d at 966, quoting Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d at 556).Applying these principles here, the evidence presented by the plaintiff provided a rational basis uponwhich the trier of fact could have concluded that the plaintiff was an infant when he entered into thesubject contract with the defendant and, therefore, that the contract was voidable at the plaintiff'selection (see Joseph v Schatzkin, 259 NY 241, 243 [1932]; Leasing Serv. Corp. v VitaItalian Rest., 171 AD2d 926, 927 [1991]; see also 67 NY Jur 2d, Infants and OtherPersons Under Legal Disability § 7). We also conclude that the plaintiff made a demand beforecommencing this action for disaffirmance of the contract and return of the money paid to the defendant,as well as tendering to the defendant the vehicle which was the subject of the agreement, and that, bycommencing this action, he unequivocally manifested his intention to disaffirm the contract (seeNathan v Karp, Inc., 214 App Div 490, 491-492 [1925]). Contrary to the Supreme Court'sdetermination, the evidence before the Supreme Court did not establish, as a matter of law, that thecontract was one for "necessaries" (see generally Sternlieb v Normandie Natl. Sec. Corp., 263NY 245 [1934]; Braham & [*2]Co., Inc. v Zittel, 232 AppDiv 406, 407 [1931]; 67 NY Jur 2d, Infants and Other Persons Under Legal Disability § 20).Furthermore, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the plaintiff's mother did not have the rightor authority to ratify the plaintiff's contract (see Kaufman v American Youth Hostels, 13 Misc2d 8, 15 [1957], mod on other grounds 6 AD2d 223 [1958]; see 67 NY Jur 2d,Infants and Other Persons Under Legal Disability § 7).
The parties' remaining contentions either are improperly raised for the first time on appeal, arewithout merit, or need not be addressed in light of our determination.
Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed, the motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as amatter of law dismissing the complaint denied, the complaint reinstated, and the matter remitted to theSupreme Court, Putnam County, for a new trial. Rivera, J.P., Dickerson, Eng and Roman, JJ., concur.