| Karpinos v Cora |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 08566 [89 AD3d 994] |
| November 22, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| David Karpinos, Appellant, v Pedro Cora,Respondent. |
—[*1] Robert P. Tusa (Sweetbaum & Sweetbaum, Lake Success, N.Y. [Marshall D. Sweetbaum], ofcounsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of theSupreme Court, Kings County (Saitta, J.), dated August 17, 2010, which granted the defendant'smotion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that he did not sustain a seriousinjury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a seriousinjury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (seeToure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955,956-957 [1992]). The plaintiff alleged that the cervical and lumbosacral regions of his spine, and hisright knee, sustained certain injuries as a result of the subject accident, and the defendant submittedcompetent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that those alleged injuries did not constituteserious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) under the permanentconsequential limitation of use or the significant limitation of use categories (see Rodriguez v Huerfano, 46 AD3d794, 795 [2007]). Furthermore, while the plaintiff also alleged that he sustained a serious injuryunder the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), the defendant submitted evidenceestablishing, prima facie, that during the 180-day period immediately following the subject accident, theplaintiff did not have an injury or impairment which, for more than 90 days, prevented him fromperforming substantially all of the acts that constituted his usual and customary daily activities (see Ranford v Tim's Tree & Lawn Serv.,Inc., 71 AD3d 973, 974 [2010]).
In opposition, the plaintiff submitted medical reports that were not in admissible form, and,therefore, were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Grasso v Angerami, 79 NY2d813, 814-815 [1991]; cf. Kearse v NewYork City Tr. Auth., 16 AD3d 45, 47 n 1 [2005]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properlygranted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Skelos, J.P., Angiolillo,Belen, Lott and Roman, JJ., concur.