| Matter of Parrella v Freely |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 08946 [90 AD3d 664] |
| December 6, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Lisa Ann Parrella, Respondent, v HeatherFreely, Appellant. |
—[*1] Edward J. Emanuele, Mineola, N.Y., Attorney for the Child.
In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Heather Freely appealsfrom an order of protection of the Family Court, Nassau County (Eisman, J.), dated July 13,2010, which, after a hearing, in effect, granted the petition of Lisa Ann Parrella to hold her inviolation of a prior order of protection dated September 15, 2009, as amended December 30,2009, and directed her, inter alia, to stay away from Lisa Ann Parrella and to refrain fromcommunication with or about Lisa Ann Parrella for a period of two years.
Ordered that the order of protection dated July 13, 2010, is reversed, on the law, withoutcosts or disbursements, the petition is denied, the order of protection dated September 15, 2009,as amended December 30, 2009, is vacated, and the proceeding is dismissed for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.
In January 2010 the appellant was dating the former boyfriend of Lisa Ann Parrella, withwhom Parrella had a child. At that time, Parrella filed a petition against the appellant, allegingthat the appellant violated a previous order of protection. On July 13, 2010, the Family Courtentered an order which, in effect, granted the petition and, inter alia, directed the appellant to stayaway from Parrella and to refrain from communicating with or about Parrella for a period of twoyears. On this appeal, the appellant argues, among other things, that the Family Court lackedsubject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding.
"The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and, thus, it 'cannot exercise powersbeyond those granted to it by statute' " (Matter of Seye v Lamar, 72 AD3d 975, 975-976 [2010], quoting Matter of Johna M.S. v Russell E.S.,10 NY3d 364, 366 [2008]). Where the Family Court had no jurisdiction to issue an order ofprotection or temporary order of protection initially, such an order "was void ab initio for allpurposes, including the power to hold [a party] in contempt" (Matter of Robert B.-H. [Robert H.], 82 AD3d 1221, 1222 [2011];see Matter of Fish v Horn, 14 NY2d 905, 906 [1964]).
Pursuant to Family Court Act § 812 (1), the Family Court's jurisdiction in familyoffense proceedings is limited to certain proscribed criminal acts that occur among enumerated[*2]classes of people, including persons who share an "intimaterelationship" with each other (Family Ct Act § 812 [1] [e]; see Matter of LaVann v Bell, 77 AD3d1422, 1423 [2010]; Matter ofJessica D. v Jeremy H., 77 AD3d 87, 88-89 [2010]). Here, there is no evidence in therecord that the appellant and Parrella had a direct relationship. Instead, the evidence revealed thatthe parties had met personally only during the course of the court proceedings and that theappellant had never met Parrella's child. Therefore, there is no evidence that the parties'relationship was an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1) (e) (see Matter of Tyrone T. vKatherine M., 78 AD3d 545 [2010]; Matter of Seye v Lamar, 72 AD3d at976-977).
Since the parties did not have an "intimate relationship" within the meaning of Family CourtAct § 812 (1) (e), the Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the originalorder of protection or to issue the order appealed from (see Matter of Fish v Horn, 14NY2d 905 [1964]).
In light of the foregoing, the appellant's remaining contentions have been rendered academic.Rivera, J.P., Dickerson, Eng and Roman, JJ., concur.