| People v Viele |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 09043 [90 AD3d 1238] |
| December 15, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Samuel D.Viele, Appellant. |
—[*1] Nicole M. Duve, District Attorney, Canton (Joshua A. HaberkornHalm of counsel), forrespondent.
Rose, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Richards,J.), rendered November 30, 2009, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime ofcriminal possession of marihuana in the first degree.
After almost 50 pounds of marihuana were found in defendant's vehicle during a traffic stop,he was charged with criminal possession of marihuana in the first degree. Defendant's motion tosuppress the evidence against him on the ground that the stop was made without probable causewas denied, and he then pleaded guilty to the indictment. Defendant now appeals, challengingonly the denial of his motion to suppress.
The unrefuted testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that defendant was initiallystopped because the pick-up truck he was driving in the early morning darkness had aninoperative headlight (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 [2] [a] [1]). The StateTrooper who made the stop issued a verbal warning about the headlight and allowed defendant tocontinue on his way. A second Trooper overheard the license and registration check on his radioand contacted the first Trooper to inquire about the stop because he sought to investigatedefendant further concerning more serious criminal activity. The second Trooper then stoppeddefendant's pick-up truck, which still had an inoperative headlight. Detecting an odor ofmarihuana, the [*2]second Trooper secured defendant's consent tosearch the vehicle, leading to discovery of the marihuana. County Court, correctly relying onPeople v Robinson (97 NY2d 341 [2001]), properly concluded that the second Trooperhad probable cause to stop the vehicle, regardless of his underlying reason.
Defendant acknowledges that a police officer has probable cause to stop a vehicletemporarily for an observed violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, but contends that theTroopers tailored their testimony to avoid constitutional objections and they conspired in badfaith to stop the vehicle the second time, thereby taking it beyond the type of pretextual stopsanctioned by Robinson. Inasmuch as the second Trooper frankly admitted that hispurpose in making the stop was to investigate criminal activity unrelated to the inoperativeheadlight, however, we can find no basis to conclude that the Troopers tailored their testimony toavoid constitutional objections (see People v Keith, 240 AD2d 967, 968 [1997], lvdenied 90 NY2d 906 [1997]). Probable cause for the stop existed in light of the undisputedtraffic violation and, as the subjective motivation to investigate other possible criminal activity"does not negate the objective reasonableness" of the stop (People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 741, 742 [2010]; see People v Douglas, 42 AD3d756, 757 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 922 [2007]), County Court properly denied themotion to suppress (see People v Wright, 98 NY2d 657, 658-659 [2002], certdenied 537 US 911 [2002]; People vHawkins, 45 AD3d 989, 991 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1034 [2008]; People v Garcia, 30 AD3d 833,834 [2006]).
Lahtinen, Kavanagh, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.