Rivera v City of New York
2011 NY Slip Op 09110 [90 AD3d 735]
December 13, 2011
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 1, 2012


Jasmine Rivera, Respondent,
v
City of New York,Appellant, et al., Defendant. (And a Third-Party Action.)

—[*1]Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Stephen J. McGrath andMichael Shender of counsel), for appellant.

Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Brian J. Shoot andMarie Ng of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant City of New Yorkappeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Velasquez, J.), dated June 16,2010, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint and allcross claims insofar as asserted against it or, in the alternative, for summary judgment dismissingthe complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it, and (2), as limited by its brief,from so much an order of the same court dated December 7, 2010, as, upon reargument, adheredto the original determination.

Ordered that the appeal from the order dated June 16, 2010, is dismissed, as that order wassuperseded by the order dated December 7, 2010, made upon reargument; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated December 7, 2010, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on thelaw, and, upon reargument, so much of the order dated June 16, 2010, as denied that branch ofthe motion of the defendant City of New York which was for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it is vacated and thereupon, that branchof the motion is granted; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant City of New York.

On March 19, 2008, the plaintiff, a frequent guest of a friend living in an apartment buildingin the Van Dyke housing project in Brooklyn, was accosted by a man in the elevator of a buildingtherein and then raped on the stairway landing leading to the roof. The plaintiff commenced thisaction against the New York City Housing Authority (hereinafter the NYCHA) and the City ofNew York alleging that, as the owner or operator of the building, each was negligent in failing toadequately secure the building. The plaintiff alleged numerous specific acts of negligence,including, among other things, the failure to secure a back door, maintain an operable intercomsystem, and maintain an adequate video surveillance and camera monitoring system.

Before the completion of discovery, the City moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) todismiss the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it or, in the alternative, for[*2]summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all crossclaims insofar as asserted against it. The Supreme Court denied the motion, without prejudice torenewal after discovery was complete. The City then moved for leave to reargue its motion. TheSupreme Court granted leave to reargue but, upon reargument, adhered to its determination.

The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the City's motion which was forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.The City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submittingproof that it did not own or otherwise control the premises where the crime occurred. Indeed, therecord demonstrates that the subject property was owned by the NYCHA, not the City.Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiff alleges specific acts of negligence against the City thatimplicate its governmental function of providing police protection, the City is immune fromthese claims (see Price v New York City Hous. Auth., 92 NY2d 553, 557-558 [1998];Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, 512-513 [1984]; see generally Matter of World Trade Ctr.Bombing Litig., 17 NY3d 428 [2011]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise atriable issue of fact. Nor is there a basis to suggest that further discovery may lead to relevantevidence sufficient to oppose the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Brennan v Gagliano, 71 AD3d 620[2010]; Kimyagarov v Nixon TaxiCorp., 45 AD3d 736 [2007]).

The plaintiff's request for the imposition of a penalty pursuant to CPLR 3126 is improperlymade for the first time on appeal.

In light of our determination, it is unnecessary to reach the City's remaining contentions.Mastro, A.P.J. Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.


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