| Matter of Gabriel C. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 09123 [90 AD3d 752] |
| December 13, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Gabriel C., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] David L. Darwin, County Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Sandra P. Williams of counsel), forrespondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Gabriel C.appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Orange County (Currier-Woods, J.),dated March 29, 2011, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated January 25,2011, made after a hearing, finding that she committed acts which, if committed by an adult,would have constituted the crimes of resisting arrest and attempted assault in the third degree,adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent and placed her on probation for a period not to exceedtwo years. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated January 25, 2011.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The appellant challenges the Family Court's finding that she committed acts which, ifcommitted by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree.Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter ofDavid H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621[1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that theappellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime ofattempted assault in the third degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00).Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of theevidence (see Matter of Steven L.,86 AD3d 613, 614 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 714 [2011]; cf. CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view thewitnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Daniel R., 51 AD3d 933, 934 [2008]; cf. People vMateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People vBleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied thatthe Family Court's fact-finding determination as to that charge was not against the weight of theevidence (cf. People v Romero, 7NY3d 633 [2006]).
"The Family Court has broad discretion in fashioning orders of disposition" (Matter of Ashanti B., 62 AD3d790, 791 [2009]; see Matter ofKaren M., 58 AD3d 734, 735 [2009]; Matter of Ashley H., 53 AD3d 578 [2008]). Here, the Family Courtprovidently exercised its discretion in adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent andplacing her on probation (see Family Ct Act § 352.2), rather than directing anadjournment in contemplation of dismissal (see Family Ct Act § 315.3). Thedisposition was appropriate in light of, inter alia, the appellant's poor school attendance, herpersistent [*2]disciplinary problems, and the recommendationmade in the probation report (see Matterof Leonard J., 67 AD3d 911, 912 [2009]; Matter of Ashanti B., 62 AD3d at 791;Matter of Ashley H., 53 AD3d at 578; Matter of Gerald W., 12 AD3d 522, 523 [2004]). Contrary to theappellant's contention, she was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal"merely because this was her first contact with the court system" (Matter of Ashley H., 53AD3d at 578; see Matter of Gerald W., 12 AD3d at 523).
The appellant's remaining contention is without merit. Dillon, J.P., Angiolillo, Florio andDickerson, JJ., concur.