| People v Tafari |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 09220 [90 AD3d 1341] |
| December 22, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Injah Tafari,Appellant. |
—[*1] Jason Kovacs, Special Prosecutor, Kingston, for respondent.
Spain, J.P. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Czajka, J.),rendered October 1, 2010, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of assault inthe second degree (two counts) and criminal mischief in the third degree, and (2) from ajudgment of said court, rendered November 19, 2010, convicting defendant upon his plea ofguilty of the crime of assault in the third degree.
As set forth in defendant's previous appeal to this Court (68 AD3d 1540 [2009]), whileincarcerated in 2005, defendant engaged in an altercation during which he threw chairs throughglass windows and caused injuries to two correction officers. As a result of this incident, afive-count indictment was handed up against defendant. Following a jury trial, he was convictedof two counts of assault in the second degree, one count of assault in the third degree and onecount of criminal mischief in the third degree and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of sevenyears with five years of postrelease supervision (id. at 1540). On appeal, this Courtreversed defendant's judgment of conviction and remitted for a new trial on the ground that hehad been denied his constitutional right to self-representation at trial (id. at 1541). Uponremittal, defendant, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to two counts of assault in the seconddegree, one count of assault in the third degree and one count of criminal mischief in the thirddegree. Thereafter, defendant sent a handwritten pro se motion to County Court seeking towithdraw his guilty plea, which was denied without prejudice, on the ground that defendant wasrepresented by [*2]counsel who could renew the motion on hisbehalf. Subsequently, defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender on the assault in thesecond degree and criminal mischief counts to an aggregate prison term of four years with fiveyears of postrelease supervision, and to a concurrent term of one year with respect to the assaultin the third degree count. These appeals followed.
Initially, we are not persuaded by defendant's argument that, given his past mental healthhistory, County Court erred by failing to sua sponte order a CPL article 730 competency hearing.Significantly, a "trial court is not required to hold a CPL article 730 hearing simply because adefendant has a history of mental illness, and such history does not necessarily render a defendantincompetent to enter a knowing and voluntary plea" (People v Lafoe, 75 AD3d 663, 663 [2010], lv denied 15NY3d 953 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Here, the plea minutesconfirm that defendant, who had been found competent following CPL article 730 examinationsconducted in the course of the earlier trial (68 AD3d at 1541), fully participated in the instantproceedings, filled out and signed a written document setting forth the particulars of the plea,appropriately answered the court's questions, conferred with counsel and, at one point, evencorrected the court on a factual detail relating to the charges against him. Under thesecircumstances, the record fails to disclose that defendant lacked the capacity to enter a knowing,voluntary and intelligent plea, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court's acceptance of theplea without holding another competency hearing; nor do we find defense counsel's failure torequest another such hearing to be evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel (see People vLafoe, 75 AD3d at 663-664; seealso People v Andrews, 78 AD3d 1229, 1232 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 827[2011]; People v Sorey, 55 AD3d1063, 1064 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 930 [2009]).
Turning to defendant's pro se brief, we find lacking in merit his contention that County Courterred in not granting his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Significantly, defendant,while represented by counsel, participated in the subsequent sentencing proceedings withoutmentioning the prior motion to withdraw or making "any statements . . . castingdoubt on the voluntariness of his plea or his guilt" (People v Good, 83 AD3d 1124, 1126 [2011], lv denied 17NY3d 816 [2011]). Thus, the court was entitled to conclude that the pro se motion to withdraw,which had not been renewed by counsel, was not being pursued and we find no basis to reverse.
Rose, Malone Jr., Stein and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.