| Staten v City of New York |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 09306 [90 AD3d 893] |
| December 20, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Marvin Staten, an Infant, by His Parent and Natural Guardian,Cassandra Dozier, et al., Plaintiffs, v City of New York et al., Respondents, and CampChen-A-Wanda, Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Stephen McGrath and VictoriaScalzo of counsel; Manisha Padi on the brief), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant CampChen-A-Wanda, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Aliotta,J.), entered September 13, 2010, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compeldisclosure of certain disciplinary records of the defendant student maintained by the defendantNew York City Department of Education.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, by deletingthe provisions thereof denying those branches of the motion which were to compel disclosure ofexhibit C and so much of exhibit B as relates to the date of February 14, 2006, and substitutingtherefor provisions granting those branches of the motion, with the redaction of the name of anonparty student mentioned in exhibit B as being involved in the February 14, 2006, incident; asso modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the appellant.
The infant plaintiff, along with his mother, suing derivatively, commenced this actionagainst, among others, the defendants New York City Department of Education (hereinafter theDOE), City of New York (hereinafter the City), Camp Chen-A-Wanda, Inc. (hereinafter theCamp), and a fellow student who was on the infant plaintiff's high school football team(hereinafter the defendant student). The plaintiffs seek to recover damages for injuries the infantplaintiff allegedly sustained on August 25, 2007, when he was at the Camp with his high schoolfootball team. Allegedly, the defendant student caused a cabin window to shatter when the infantplaintiff's face was near it. The plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the DOE, the City, and the Campwere negligent in failing to properly supervise the infants in their charge. Prior to joinder ofissue, the Camp moved pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel the DOE to disclose any information ithad pertaining to disciplinary or other actions taken by the high school against the defendantstudent as a result of the incident, as well as any other disciplinary records concerning thatstudent while he was a member of the football team. Following an in-camera review of thematerial sought to be disclosed, the [*2]Supreme Court denied theCamp's motion on the basis that such information was not material or necessary to theprosecution of the action. The Camp appeals. We modify.
"While discovery determinations rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, theAppellate Division is vested with a corresponding power to substitute its own discretion for thatof the trial court, even in the absence of abuse" (Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94NY2d 740, 745 [2000]; see Lewis vJohn, 87 AD3d 564 [2011]).
Generally, schools are "under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge andthey will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequatesupervision" (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]). In its motion tocompel, the Camp contended that it was entitled to discovery of any disciplinary records relatingto the defendant student that were in the DOE's possession because such records were relevant tothe issue of whether the DOE or the City had prior knowledge of behavioral issues regarding thedefendant student, but failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent the incident (see McLeod v City of New York, 32AD3d 907 [2006]). The Camp argued, in essence, that discovery of such records wasrelevant to identifying which defendant was at fault for the incident, and thus, was material andnecessary to the Camp's defense in this action.
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding the disclosure ofcertain evidence that was relevant to the parties' potential liability. Specifically, disclosure of thedocument labeled exhibit C, a letter by the high school's principal regarding any disciplinaryaction taken by the high school as a result of the incident, should be disclosed, since it is materialand necessary to the issue of liability. Further, there were records of prior incidents involving thedefendant student's behavior, labeled as exhibit B. One portion of the disciplinary records of thedefendant student contained in exhibit B is material and necessary to the Camp's defense, thatportion being the entry dated February 14, 2006. This portion of exhibit B is relevant to the issueof whether school officials had actual or constructive notice of prior conduct similar to thatwhich occurred at the Camp and which could constitute a basis for imposing liability (seeMirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d at 49; Doe v Department of Educ. of City of N.Y., 54 AD3d 352, 353[2008]; Culbert v City of New York, 254 AD2d 385, 388 [1998]). To the extent that theFebruary 14, 2006, entry contains the name of a nonparty student, that name shall be redactedprior to disclosure.
Lastly, while the material is subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of1974 (20 USC § 1232g) (see generally United States v Miami Univ., 91 F Supp 2d1132, 1134 [2000], affd 294 F3d 797 [2002]), commonly referred to as the "BuckleyAmendment," that statute is not violated when disclosure is furnished via a judicial order(see 20 USC § 1232g [b] [2]). Mastro, A.P.J., Florio, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.