| People v Winkfield |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 09358 [90 AD3d 959] |
| December 20, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Marvin Winkfield, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Keith Dolan ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Mullen, J.),rendered September 5, 2007, convicting him of rape in the first degree, burglary in the seconddegree (two counts), assault in the second degree (two counts), and criminal possession of aweapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings upfor review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion whichwas to suppress his statement to a law enforcement official.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We reject the defendant's contention that his statement to a law enforcement official shouldhave been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. Under the circumstances presented here,the arrest of the defendant by Florida authorities was lawful. The Florida authorities relied on aNew York State arrest warrant and, therefore, could presume that the New York authorities hadprobable cause to arrest the defendant (see generally People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 577 [2004]).Furthermore, at the suppression hearing, it was clearly demonstrated that the New Yorkauthorities had probable cause to arrest the defendant (see People v Warren, 12 AD3d 708 [2004]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, a review of the totality of the circumstancesdemonstrates that the defendant's statement was voluntarily made (see People v Seabrooks, 82 AD3d1130 [2011]).
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt ofburglary in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484,491-492 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to theprosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legallysufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of both counts of burglary in the second degreebeyond a reasonable doubt (see People vClarke, 65 AD3d 1055, 1056 [2009]). Moreover, upon our independent review pursuantto CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt on the counts charging burglary in thesecond degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]). The prosecutionproduced sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could infer that the [*2]defendant unlawfully remained in the subject building (see People v Garvey, 25 AD3d808 [2006]; People v Acosta, 273 AD2d 318 [2000]; People v Burnett, 205AD2d 792 [1994]; People v DeLarosa, 172 AD2d 156 [1991]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, he was not deprived of the effective assistance ofcounsel (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 [1998]).
The defendant's contention that a DNA swab should have been suppressed has not beenconsidered because it is improperly raised for the first time in his reply brief (see People v Boynton, 35 AD3d875 [2006]).
The defendant's remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event,without merit. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Hall and Cohen, JJ., concur.