| People v Dillon |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 09362 [90 AD3d 1468] |
| December 23, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Dillon,Appellant. |
—[*1] John H. Crandall, District Attorney, Herkimer, for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Herkimer County Court (Patrick L. Kirk, J.), rendered March25, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal mischief in thethird degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminalmischief in the third degree (Penal Law § 145.05 [2]), defendant contends that his plea wasnot knowing, intelligent and voluntary because he did not understand the plea proceedings or thedirect consequences of his plea. Although that contention survives defendant's waiver of the rightto appeal, defendant failed to preserve his contention for our review by failing to move towithdraw the plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction (see People v Watkins, 77 AD3d 1403 [2010], lv denied 15NY3d 956 [2010]; People v Baker,49 AD3d 1293 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 932 [2008]). In any event, defendant'scontention is without merit inasmuch as the record establishes that the plea was knowingly,intelligently and voluntarily entered (seegenerally People v Mullen, 77 AD3d 686 [2010]; People v Sartori, 8 AD3d 748, 749 [2004]).
We conclude that the People established by a preponderance of the evidence that the twovictims sustained out-of-pocket losses in the amounts of $28,543.50 and $9,460, respectively (see People v Ford, 77 AD3d 1176,1176-1177 [2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 816 [2011]; People v Butler, 70 AD3d 1509 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d886 [2010]; People v Katovich, 238 AD2d 751 [1997]). By failing to request a hearing onthe issue whether he had the ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered by County Court,defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention that the court failed to considerhis ability to pay the restitution (see Penal Law § 65.10 [2] [g]; see generallyFord, 77 AD3d at 1177; People vPassalacqua, 43 AD3d 964 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1037 [2008]). In anyevent, the record establishes that the presentence report reviewed by the court containedinformation with respect to defendant's education history and employment income, and thus weconclude that the court considered defendant's ability to pay the restitution pursuant to Penal Law§ 65.10 (2) (g) (see People v Christman, 265 AD2d 856 [1999], lv denied94 NY2d 878 [2000]). We note that defendant may apply for resentencing pursuant to CPL420.10 (5) and, in the event that the court determines that defendant is unable to pay therestitution "despite sufficient good faith efforts to acquire the resources to do so. . .[, it] must consider measures of punishment other [*2]than imprisonment" (People v Amorosi, 96 NY2d 180, 184[2001]; see generally Tate v Short, 401 US 395, 399 [1971]).
All concur except Carni, J., who dissents in part and votes to modify in accordance with thefollowing memorandum.
Carni, J. (dissenting in part). I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of my colleagues thatdefendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that County Court failed to consider hisability to pay the restitution. I also disagree that the record establishes that the court considereddefendant's ability to pay the restitution in the total amount of $39,903.68. Therefore, I dissent inpart.
Upon his conviction of criminal mischief in the third degree (Penal Law § 145.05 [2]),defendant was sentenced to five years of probation and ordered to pay restitution to two victimsin the total amount of $39,903.68, including the 5% surcharge. Defendant's sentence did notinclude an incarceration component. With respect to the issue of preservation, I note that themajority relies upon People v Ford(77 AD3d 1176 [2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 816 [2011]), which did not involve adefendant who was sentenced to probation and ordered to pay restitution as a condition of suchprobationary sentence but, rather, the defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term ofimprisonment of 2 to 4 years and ordered to pay restitution. Also, the majority relies upon People v Passalacqua (43 AD3d964 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1037 [2008]), which provides no indication of thenature of the sentence imposed in conjunction with restitution. The nature of the sentenceimposed is critical to the preservation analysis because Penal Law § 65.10, entitled"Conditions of probation and of conditional discharge," permits the court to impose restitution asa condition of the sentence of probation only "in an amount [defendant] can afford to pay"(§ 65.10 [2] [g]). That restitution provision applies exclusively to a sentence of probationwith restitution as a condition thereof (see id.). It is well settled that "the 'essential nature'of the right to be sentenced as provided by law, though not formally raised at the trial level,preserves a departure therefrom for [our] review" (People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152, 156[1982], quoting People v Craig, 295 NY 116, 120 [1946]; see People v Aquino, 83 AD3d1532 [2011]).
Turning to the merits of defendant's contention concerning restitution, the record does notcontain any evidence that the court considered defendant's ability to pay the restitution. Thecourt's written restitution decision is silent with respect to that issue. I cannot agree that weshould search the record on appeal, as the majority has done, to reach the conclusion that thecourt considered defendant's ability to pay. Indeed, even if it was appropriate to search the recordhere, in doing so it becomes evident that the court could not have considered defendant's abilityto pay the restitution. The presentence report establishes that defendant's last employment was asa laborer earning $8.00 per hour in a 25 hour work week. The court's restitution decision filed onMarch 29, 2010 requires defendant to pay a final payment of $39,903.68 on or before January 9,2015. There being no rational relationship between that requirement and defendant's ability topay it, I cannot conclude that the court considered defendant's ability to pay as required by PenalLaw § 65.10 (2) (g).
Therefore, I would modify the judgment by vacating the amount of restitution ordered andremit the matter to County Court for a new hearing to determine the amount of restitution inaccordance with defendant's ability to pay that amount. Present—Scudder, P.J., Peradotto,Carni, Gorski and Martoche, JJ.