| Grossman v New York Life Ins. Co. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 09593 [90 AD3d 990] |
| December 27, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Israel Grossman et al., Appellants, v New York LifeInsurance Company, Respondent. (And a Third-Party Action.) |
—[*1] Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, New York, N.Y. (E. Leo Milonas, Maria T. Galeno,and Andrew C. Smith of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiffs appeal (1)from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Demarest, J.), dated January 26, 2010, whichgranted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, (2), as limitedby their brief, from so much of an order of the same court dated June 16, 2010, as denied theirmotion for leave to renew and reargue their opposition to the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint, and (3) from an order of the same court dated July 6, 2010,which granted the defendant's application to impose a sanction upon the plaintiff IsraelGrossman, and directed that plaintiff to pay the sum of $10,000 to the Lawyers' Fund for ClientProtection.
Ordered that the order dated January 26, 2010, is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order dated June 16, 2010, as denied that branchof the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to reargue is dismissed, as no appeal lies from anorder denying reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated June 16, 2010, is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
Ordered that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from the order dated July 6,2010, is treated as an application for leave to appeal from that order, and leave to appeal isgranted (see CPLR 5701); and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated July 6, 2010, is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.[*2]
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of thedefendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted by the plaintiff Israel Grossman (hereinafter Grossman) on the ground that it was barredby the doctrine of res judicata. "[U]nder the transactional approach adopted by New York in resjudicata jurisprudence, 'once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising outof the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theoriesor if seeking a different remedy' " (Marinelli Assoc. v Helmsley-Noyes Co., 265 AD2d 1,5 [2000], quoting O'Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981]). The defendantdemonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law against Grossman bypresenting evidence that the claims asserted by him in the instant action were barred by a priorfinal determination by an arbitration panel, which adjudicated claims arising out of the sametransaction or series of transactions as the claims he asserts herein. In opposition, Grossmanfailed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which wasfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff RaphaelGrossman. The cause of action alleging a breach of an oral and implied contract is barred by theintegration clauses in his written contracts with the defendant (see Gebbia vToronto-Dominion Bank, 306 AD2d 37, 38 [2003]), and the existence of valid andenforceable written contracts precludes recovery under the causes of action sounding inpromissory estoppel and unjust enrichment, which arise out of the same subject matter (see Goldman v Metropolitan Life Ins.Co., 5 NY3d 561, 572 [2005]; Yenrab, Inc. v 794 Linden Realty, LLC, 68 AD3d 755, 758-759[2009]; Stark v City of New York,31 AD3d 530, 531 [2006]; Shah v Micro Connections, 286 AD2d 433, 433-434[2001]).
That branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to renew their opposition to thedefendant's motion for summary judgment was properly denied, since the new facts offered onthe motion would not have changed the prior determination (see CPLR 2221 [e] [2], [3]).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in imposing a sanction againstGrossman (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [a], [c]).
We decline the defendant's request for the imposition of sanctions against the plaintiffs, andthe plaintiffs' request for the imposition of sanctions against the defendant, based upon allegedlyfrivolous conduct on this appeal (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [a], [c]; Barns & Farms Realty, LLC v Novelli,82 AD3d 689, 691 [2011]).
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be addressed inlight of our determination. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Eng and Austin, JJ., concur.