| Matter of Seth P. v Margaret D. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 09648 [90 AD3d 1053] |
| December 27, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Seth P., Respondent, v Margaret D.,Appellant. Terrance D., Nonparty Appellant; Karen P. Simmons, NonpartyRespondent. |
—[*1] Karen P. Simmons, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Janet Neustaetter of counsel), attorney for thechildren.
In two paternity proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 5, the mother and nonpartyTerrance D. appeal (1), as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court,Kings County (Krauss, J.), dated January 19, 2011, as, without a hearing, granted that branch ofthe cross motion of the attorney for the children which was to equitably estop the mother fromdenying that the petitioner is the father of the subject children, denied their motion to suspend ormodify the petitioner's visitation with the subject children, granted the petition, and adjudicatedthe petitioner to be the father of the subject children, and (2) from an order of filiation of thesame court, also dated January 19, 2011, adjudging the petitioner to be the father of Kevin P.D.,one of the subject children.
Ordered that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from the order and the order offiliation is deemed an application for leave to appeal from both orders, and leave to appeal isgranted (see Family Ct Act § 1112 [a]); and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements;and it is further,
Ordered that the order of filiation is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In 1998, the petitioner and the appellant Margaret D. (hereinafter the mother), who wasmarried to the nonparty-appellant Terrance D., were engaged in a sexual relationship. On May21, 1999, the mother gave birth to twins. From the time the twins were born to approximately2007 or 2008, the mother permitted the petitioner to hold himself out as the children's biologicalfather and permitted them to develop a parent-child relationship. She also allowed the children todevelop a relationship with the paternal grandmother. In May 2008, after the mother began tokeep the [*2]children away from the petitioner, the petitionercommenced these two paternity proceedings (one as to each child). The Family Court appliedthe doctrine of equitable estoppel in adjudicating that the petitioner was the father of the children.
"The paramount concern in applying equitable estoppel in paternity cases is the best interestsof the subject child[ren]" (Matter ofLeonardo Antonio V. v Estate of Joanna B., 82 AD3d 1253, 1254 [2011]; see Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7NY3d 320, 326 [2006]; Matter ofJuan A. v Rosemarie N., 55 AD3d 827, 827-828 [2008]). "Since the Family Court waspresented with sufficient information to make a determination as to the subject child[ren]'s bestinterests, the Family Court properly granted the . . . petition on the ground ofequitable estoppel without conducting a hearing" (Matter of Leonardo Antonio V. v Estate ofJoanna B., 82 AD3d at 1254; seeMatter of Maurice T. v Mark P., 23 AD3d 567 [2005]; Matter of Griffin vMarshall, 294 AD2d 438, 439 [2002]). Furthermore, the Family Court possessed sufficientinformation to render, without a hearing, an informed visitation determination consistent with thebest interests of the children (see Matterof Perez v Sepulveda, 60 AD3d 1072, 1073 [2009]; Matter of Perez v Sepulveda, 51 AD3d 673, 673-674 [2008]; Matter of Hom v Zullo, 6 AD3d536 [2004]). Skelos, J.P., Belen, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.