Matter of Yaros
2011 NY Slip Op 09660 [90 AD3d 1063]
December 27, 2011
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 1, 2012


In the Matter of Harry Yaros, Deceased. Neal Yaros, Appellant;Mark Greenberg, as Limited Administrator of the Estate of Laura Yaros Greenberg, Deceased,Respondent.

—[*1]Novick & Associates, Huntington, N.Y. (Donald Novick, and Albert V. Messina, Jr., ofcounsel), for appellant.

Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Edward L. Birnbaum, Miriam Skolnik, Neil R.Finkston, Bryan Lipsky, and Herbert Rubin of counsel), for respondent.

In a contested probate proceeding, the petitioner, Neal Yaros, appeals from an order of theSurrogate's Court, Queens County (Nahman, S.), dated January 6, 2009, which denied his motionfor summary judgment, in effect, disallowing the claim of Laura Yaros Greenberg that she is therightful owner of the proceeds of a certain account with the United States Trust Company of NewYork.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs payable by the appellant personally.

In general, the deposit of funds into a joint account constitutes prima facie evidence of anintent to create a joint tenancy (see Banking Law § 675; Jacks v D'Ambrosio, 69 AD3d574, 574 [2010]; Matter ofDubin, 54 AD3d 947, 949 [2008]; Matter of Richichi, 38 AD3d 558, 559 [2007]; Matter of Fayo, 7 AD3d 795, 796[2004]). The statutory presumption created by Banking Law § 675, however, can berebutted "by providing direct proof that no joint tenancy was intended or substantialcircumstantial proof that the joint account had been opened for convenience only" (Matter ofRichichi, 38 AD3d at 559 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Dubin,54 AD3d at 949; Wacikowski v Wacikowski, 93 AD2d 885 [1983]).

Here, the petitioner submitted evidence sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption that ajoint account was created. Although Laura Yaros Greenberg (hereinafter Greenberg), thedecedent's daughter, claimed a right of survivorship in the account, she previously described theaccount as a "dual signature account," which her father wanted so that his money would be"safeguarded." In addition to these statements, which supported the conclusion that the accountwas created as a convenience account, evidence was submitted showing that the decedent was thesole depositor to the account, that Greenberg never made any withdrawals from the account, andthat the creation of a joint account would represent a substantial deviation from the decedent'spreviously expressed testamentary plan (see Matter of Concoran, 63 AD3d 93, 97 [2009];Matter of Richichi, 38 AD3d [*2]at 560; Wacikowskiv Wacikowski, 93 AD2d at 885; Matter of Camarda, 63 AD2d 837, 839 [1978]).Further, although the account was marked as a "joint account with rights of survivorship," theaccount agreement specified that the decedent and Greenberg were both required to sign beforeany payment or delivery of property would be made. Such language indicates that the decedentdid not intend to make a present gift of one-half of the account (see Matter of Zecca, 152AD2d 830, 831 [1989]). Under the circumstances, this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate,prima facie, that the decedent did not open the account with the intent of creating a joint tenancywith a right of survivorship.

In opposition to the petitioner's prima facie showing, however, Greenberg raised triableissues of fact concerning the decedent's intent (cf. Matter of Dubin, 54 AD3d at 949). Inaddition to relying upon the account documents and statutory presumption under the BankingLaw, Greenberg presented deposition testimony from a bank employee who was present whenthe account was created. That employee testified, among other things, that she had explained tothe decedent the "gift tax implications" that he would incur, and that the decedent "understood"the implications of "giving [away] half of his assets." As this evidence established the existenceof triable issues of fact as to the decedent's intent, the Surrogate's Court properly denied thepetitioner's motion for summary judgment (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49NY2d 557, 560 [1980]). Angiolillo, J.P., Lott, Austin and Cohen, JJ., concur.


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