| Matter of Bello v New York State Off. of Temporary & DisabilityAssistance |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 09757 [90 AD3d 1706] |
| December 30, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Leydy S. Bello, Petitioner, v New York StateOffice of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Treasure of counsel), forrespondent.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of theSupreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, NiagaraCounty [Richard C. Kloch, Sr., A.J.], entered October 6, 2010) to review a determination ofrespondent. The determination required petitioner to repay emergency assistance funds.
It is hereby ordered that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and thepetition is dismissed.
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul thedetermination following a fair hearing that required her to repay the emergency assistance fundspaid to her electric and gas services providers. "[T]he role of a court reviewing an administrativedetermination is limited to ensuring that the determination arrived at following an adversarialhearing is supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Jason B. v Novello, 12 NY3d 107, 114 [2009]; seeCPLR 7803 [4]; Faber vMerrifield, 11 AD3d 1009 [2004]). "Substantial evidence means such relevant proof asa reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" (Matter of Johnson v Town of Amherst,74 AD3d 1896, 1897 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 712 [2010] [internal quotationmarks omitted]; see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d176, 180-181 [1978]).
Here, respondent concluded that petitioner was required to repay the emergency assistancefunds in question inasmuch as her gross monthly income exceeded the applicable publicassistance standard of need (see 18 NYCRR 352.5 [e]; see generally New YorkState Off. of Temporary & Disability Assistance Administrative Directive 2002 ADM-2).Petitioner contends that the determination is not supported by substantial evidence becauserespondent erroneously characterized an "interest-free loan" as income in calculating her grossmonthly income. We reject that contention. Respondent was faced with conflicting evidencewhether certain funds received by petitioner were loans rather than income. " '[I]t is for theadministrative tribunal, not the courts, to weigh conflicting evidence, assess the credibility ofwitnesses, and determine which [evidence] to accept and which to reject' . . . ThisCourt may not substitute its judgment for that of respondent" in rejecting petitioner's position thatthe funds at issue constitute loans rather than income (Faber, 11 AD3d at 1010; seeMatter of Padulo v Reed, [*2]63 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2009],lv denied 13 NY3d 716 [2010]).
Contrary to petitioner's further contention, pursuant to respondent's "Energy Manual," it isnot required to pay miscellaneous charges, including reconnect fees (see 18 NYCRR352.5 [e]). Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Peradotto, Carni and Sconiers, JJ.