| Matter of Vaughn v Koktowski |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 00071 [91 AD3d 1002] |
| Jnury 5, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Wesley Vaughn, Appellant, v Kevin Koktowski, asSenior Counselor of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision,Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Treasure of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Gilpatric, J.), entered March 15, 2011 inAlbany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, dismissed the petition.
Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections and CommunitySupervision. When he was first committed to a state prison facility in 1986, petitioner wasclassified as a maximum A security risk because he had, among other things, been previouslyarrested and charged with escape in the second degree. Between 1991 and 1994, he was releasedfrom state prison and placed on parole, only to be incarcerated because he had been charged withadditional crimes. Upon his return to state prison, petitioner was classified as a medium securityrisk. In 2006, the Department reviewed petitioner's classification and determined that he shouldbe classified as a maximum A security risk. Notably, petitioner did not challenge thisdetermination to reclassify him as a maximum A security risk and he was subsequently releasedto parole supervision. Once again, petitioner was returned to the Department's custody basedupon a parole violation and again classified as a maximum A security risk. After petitionerunsuccessfully appealed this classification through administrative channels, he commenced this[*2]CPLR article 78 proceeding. Upon the dismissal of thepetition, petitioner now appeals.[FN*]
Petitioner challenges his classification as a maximum A security risk as being arbitrary andcapricious on the ground that, for more than 10 years while incarcerated and classified as aminimum security risk, nothing occurred that would warrant an elevation of his security status.We disagree. "[P]rison administrators have broad discretion in matters concerning institutionalsecurity" (Matter of Mohsin vFischer, 51 AD3d 1233, 1234 [2008]). As previously stated, petitioner did not challengethe Department's decision in 2006 to reinstate his classification as a maximum A security risk.Also, while petitioner now claims that there was no reason for such a change, we note that duringthis intervening period petitioner was charged with numerous violations of parole and wasreturned to state prison no less than three times. This record, coupled with petitioner's priorcriminal history, which includes a charge of escape in the second degree, provides a rational basisfor the Department's decision to classify him as a maximum A security risk (see generally Matter of Frejomil vFischer, 59 AD3d 790, 791 [2009]; Matter of Georgiou v Daniel, 21 AD3d 1230, 1231-1232 [2005]).
Peters, J.P., Spain, Malone Jr., Kavanagh and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that thejudgment is affirmed, without costs.
Footnote *: Supreme Court dismissed thepetition based upon respondent having raised an objection in point of law that the proceedingwas untimely. On appeal, respondent now concedes that the proceeding is not barred by thefour-month statute of limitations (see CPLR 217 [1]) and was timely commenced. Sincethe parties have addressed the merits of the proceeding in their briefs, we will consider them inthe interest of judicial economy rather than remit the matter (see Matter of Geames vTravis, 284 AD2d 843 [2001], appeal dismissed 97 NY2d 639 [2001]).