| Parrott v Logos Capital Mgt., LLC |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 00125 [91 AD3d 488] |
| Jnury 12, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Timothy Parrott et al., Respondents-Appellants, v LogosCapital Management, LLC, et al., Appellants-Respondents. |
—[*1] Wiggin and Dana LLP, New York (R. Scott Greathead of counsel), forrespondents-appellants.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered on or about May 26,2011, which granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment,unanimously affirmed, with costs to be paid by defendants.
This action against the corporate defendants, Logos Capital Management, LLC and QuixPartners, LLC, the investment advisor for and general partner of two hedge funds of which theindividual defendant, Peter Sasaki, is the managing partner, arises from two one-page investmentagreements between plaintiffs and Sasaki, both of which were drafted by Sasaki. Defendantsmaintain that Sasaki is not personally liable pursuant to the agreements while plaintiffs' affidavitsstate that it was the parties' intent that Sasaki be personally bound. The prefatory clauses do notstate that Sasaki intended to execute the agreements on behalf of or as an agent for the defendantcompanies Logos and Quix; instead, the clauses state that Sasaki, sole owner of defendant Logos,sought to partner with plaintiffs to build the business of Logos and Quix. Sasaki was individuallynamed throughout the agreements and was granted "the right of first refusal" should plaintiffsdecide to sell their shares. Thus, since the agreements do not specify whether Sasaki executed theagreements in his individual capacity or as an agent on behalf of the corporate defendants, thereis an ambiguity that requires the admission of parol evidence and raises an issue of factprecluding an award of judgment as a matter of law (Rivera v St. Regis Hotel JointVenture, 240 AD2d 332 [1997]).
Further, the evidence that Sasaki threatened to close down the investment companies and thefunds should plaintiffs attempt to exercise their contractual rights to sell their interests to anyinstitutional investor on any terms, raises an issue of fact with respect to plaintiffs' claims foranticipatory repudiation and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing (seeComputer Possibilities Unlimited v Mobil Oil Corp., 301 AD2d 70, 77 [2002], lvdenied 100 NY2d 504 [2003]).
However, the motion court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims for conversion and unjustenrichment, as "the existence of a valid contract governing the subject matter generally precludesrecovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter" (Adelaide Prods., Inc. v BKN Intl. AG,38 AD3d 221, 225 [2007]). Plaintiffs' claim for tortious interference with prospectivebusiness relations was also properly dismissed, as, at a minimum, [*2]plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that a contract would havebeen entered into with a prospective buyer "but for" defendant's conduct (see Bankers TrustCo. v Bernstein, 169 AD2d 400, 401 [1991]). Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias,Saxe, Freedman and RomÁn, JJ.