| 2261 Palmer Ave. Corp. v Malick |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 00506 [91 AD3d 853] |
| Jnury 24, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| 2261 Palmer Avenue Corporation, Respondent, v LynnMalick, Appellant. |
—[*1] Goldenberg & Selker, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Diane E. Selker of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action for ejectment and to recover damages for use and occupancy, the defendantappeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, WestchesterCounty (Lefkowitz, J.), entered February 22, 2011, as granted that branch of the plaintiff's motionwhich was pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment, and denied that branchof her cross motion which was to vacate her default in appearing or answering the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In order to vacate her default in appearing or answering the complaint, the defendant wasrequired to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentiallymeritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Bank of Am. v Faracco, 89 AD3d879 [2011]; Community Preserv.Corp. v Bridgewater Condominiums, LLC, 89 AD3d 784 [2011]; see also Swensen v MV Transp., Inc.,89 AD3d 924 [2011]). Even if the defendant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for herdefault, our review of the record establishes that she failed to demonstrate a potentiallymeritorious defense to the action. The papers submitted in support of her cross motion, inter alia,to vacate her default in appearing or answering the complaint were replete with self-serving,vague, and unsubstantiated denials and unsupported legal conclusions as to whether a potentiallymeritorious defense to the action existed, and were thus an insufficient basis for vacating herdefault (see That v Lutheran Med.Ctr., 89 AD3d 837 [2011]; Garal Wholesalers, Ltd. v Raven Brands, Inc., 82 AD3d 1041[2011]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion whichwas pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment, and properly denied thatbranch of the defendant's cross motion which was to vacate her default in appearing or answeringthe complaint. Florio, J.P., Belen, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.