| Matter of Natasha G. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 00781 [91 AD3d 948] |
| Jnury 31, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Natasha G., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Larry A. Sonnenshein ofcounsel; Kathy Chang on the brief), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Natasha G.appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Hunt, J.), datedDecember 2, 2010, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated October 20, 2010,made upon her admission, finding that she had committed acts which, if committed by an adult,would have constituted the crimes of petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property inthe fifth degree, adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent and placed her on probation for a periodof 12 months.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Despite the fact that the term of the appellant's probation has already expired, there may becollateral consequences resulting from the adjudication of delinquency and, therefore, the appealhas not been rendered academic (seeMatter of Tafari M., 90 AD3d 1052 [2011]; Matter of Isaiah I., 23 AD3d 469 [2005]; Matter of EjiroA., 268 AD2d 428 [2000]; see also Family Ct Act § 381.2 [2]).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretionin adjudicating her a juvenile delinquent and directing a 12-month period of probation instead ofgiving her an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (see Family Ct Act §315.3). In juvenile delinquency proceedings, the Family Court has broad discretion indetermining the proper disposition (seeMatter of Antoine H., 81 AD3d 646 [2011]; Matter of Eunique B., 73 AD3d 764 [2010]). The appellant was notentitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was her firstencounter with the law, or in light of the other mitigating circumstances that she cites (see Matter of Liston J., 81 AD3d648, 648 [2011]). The record establishes that the Family Court's imposition of probation wasthe least restrictive alternative consistent with the appellant's best interests and the need forprotection of the community (see Family Ct Act § 352.2 [2] [a]). Balkin, J.P.,Leventhal, Belen and Roman, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 29 Misc 3d 1228(A), 2010NY Slip Op 52080(U).]