| Kaufman v Medical Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 00882 [92 AD3d 1057] |
| February 9, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Deborah Kaufman, Respondent-Appellant, v Medical LiabilityMutual Insurance Company, Appellant-Respondent, et al.,Defendant. |
—[*1] Morton Povman, P.C., Forest Hills (Bruce Povman of counsel), forrespondent-appellant.
Egan Jr., J. Cross appeals from an order of the Supreme Court (Devine, J.), entered April 20,2011 in Albany County, which denied a motion by defendant Medical Liability Mutual InsuranceCompany for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.
In November 2003, Jamie Lee Norton presented at Nathan Littauer Hospital and NursingHome in Fulton County for the birth of her second child. The child was delivered by PatriciaNguyen, an obstetrician employed by the hospital. During the course of her hospital stay,Norton—who received treatment from both Nguyen and plaintiff, also an obstetricianemployed by the hospital—developed a virulent infection that ultimately necessitatedextensive surgical and other medical interventions.
Norton and her spouse, derivatively, thereafter commenced a medical malpractice action[*2]against the hospital, Nguyen and plaintiff, and defendantMedical Liability Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter defendant) assigned defendant Carter,Conboy, Case, Blackmore, Maloney & Laird, P.C. (hereinafter Carter Conboy)—awell-respected law firm engaged in the defense of medical malpractice actions—torepresent them. Following a trial, a jury awarded Norton and her spouse $5.75 million indamages,[FN1]which the trial court reduced to $3.5 million. Upon appeal, this Court further reduced the awardof damages to $3.2 million, but otherwise affirmed (Norton v Nguyen, 49 AD3d 927 [2008]). Defendant thereafter paidthe full amount of the judgment awarded to Norton and her spouse.
In the interim, and approximately two weeks after the verdict was rendered,plaintiff—for the first time—protested the fact that she, Nguyen and the hospital hadbeen represented by the same attorney. In response, and upon plaintiff's request, defendantprovided plaintiff—at its expense—with separate appellate counsel. Following thisCourt's decision in the underlying case, plaintiff commenced this action against defendant andCarter Conboy, asserting breach of contract and deceptive business practices claims againstdefendant and alleging legal malpractice as to Carter Conboy. After issue was joined, defendantmoved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.[FN2]Supreme Court denied defendant's motion in its entirety, and both defendant and plaintiff nowappeal.[FN3]
Initially, we agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in failing to grant its motion forsummary judgment as to plaintiff's General Business Law § 349 cause of action. "A partyseeking to recover under section 349 must, as a threshold [matter], allege that the defendant's actsor practices have a broad impact on consumers at large" (Walsh v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,289 AD2d 842, 843-844 [2001] [citation omitted]; see Elacqua v Physicians' Reciprocal Insurers, 52 AD3d 886, 888[2008]; Green Harbour Homeowners' Assn. v G.H. Dev. & Constr., 307 AD2d 465, 468[2003], lv dismissed 100 NY2d 640 [2003]). "Private contract disputes, unique to theparties . . . [do] not fall within the ambit of the statute" (Oswego Laborers' Local214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d 20, 25 [1995] [citation omitted]; see Wellsburg Truck & Auto Sales, Inc. vPeoples State Bank of Wyalusing, 80 AD3d 942, 943 [2011]). Here, plaintiff didnothing more than assert—in a conclusory and otherwise unsubstantiatedfashion—that defendant "engaged in deceptive business practices" and that its conduct inthis regard "was not an isolated incident." As there is nothing in the record to suggest a pattern ofconsumer-oriented misconduct on the part of defendant (compare Elacqua v Physicians'Reciprocal Insurers, 52 AD3d at 888-889), defendant's motion for summary judgmentdismissing this particular cause of action should have been granted.[*3]
We reach a similar conclusion as to plaintiff's breach ofcontract claim. In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted an affidavitfrom one of its claims adjusters, who averred that upon its receipt, he reviewed the complaint inthe Norton action, ascertained that all of the claims asserted against each of the coveredinsureds—the hospital, Nguyen and plaintiff—fell within the coverage of theunderlying insurance policy and promptly arranged for Carter Conboy to defend the subjectlitigation. The adjuster further averred that defendant had no contact with either plaintiff orNguyen between defendant's receipt of the summons and complaint and the assignment of CarterConboy as defense counsel, and there is no evidence that plaintiff expressed any dissatisfactionwith the joint representation provided by defendant until after she had sampled the verdict.Further, the underlying complaint failed to set forth any facts that would have placed defendanton notice of an actual or apparent conflict of interest. Notably, the complaint itself was so tersethat it did not even hint at the particular acts of malpractice allegedly attributable to the hospital,Nguyen or plaintiff, nor did it in any way suggest that the Nortons considered one of thedefendants named therein to be any more culpable than the others. Absent any other evidencesuggesting an actual or apparent conflict of interest with respect to plaintiff, which the recordbefore us fails to disclose, defendant had no duty to appoint separate counsel to represent her(see generally Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v Goldfarb, 53 NY2d 392, 401 n [1981]). Thus,we are satisfied that defendant discharged its initial burden on the motion for summary judgment,thereby imposing upon plaintiff the obligation to tender sufficient admissible proof to raise aquestion of fact in this regard.
This she failed to do. To the extent that plaintiff asserted—in a bill of particularsverified only by counsel—that she was "misle[d] . . . on multiple occasionsthat the case against her would be discontinued and that [Nguyen] would be the only party toeither pay a settlement or take a verdict," we need note only that this statement fails to qualify asproof in admissible form (see Rought vPrice Chopper Operating Co., Inc., 73 AD3d 1414, 1417 [2010] [Rose, J., dissenting];Matter of Allen, 210 AD2d 856, 857 [1994]; see also Benaquista v Burke, 74 AD3d 1514, 1515-1516 [2010])and, in any event, is insufficient to raise a question of fact as to the purported conflict of interest.Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment should have been granted in its entirety.
Spain, J.P., Lahtinen, Malone Jr. and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, onthe law, with costs, motion granted, summary judgment awarded to defendant Medical LiabilityMutual Insurance Company and complaint dismissed against it.
Footnote 1: The jury apportioned liabilitybetween Nguyen (65%) and plaintiff (35%).
Footnote 2: Carter Conboy took no positionon the motion, except to assert that it "did not have a conflict of interest with respect to the legalservices it provided to . . . plaintiff . . . and that all appropriateconsents and waivers were obtained."
Footnote 3: The stated basis for plaintiff'scross appeal is her belief that, by failing to expressly address her claim against defendant fordeceptive business practices, Supreme Court "implicitly dismiss[ed]" that particular cause ofaction.