| Liounis v New York City Tr. Auth. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 00934 [92 AD3d 643] |
| February 7, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Lauren Liounis, Respondent, v New York City TransitAuthority et al., Defendants, and Moussa Zlita, Appellant. |
—[*1] Arze & Mollica, LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Raymond J. Mollica of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Moussa Zlita appealsfrom a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schneier, J.), dated August 2, 2010,which, upon the denial of his motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, in effect, made at the close of theplaintiff's case, for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain aserious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), upon the denial of hisrenewed motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of all the evidence, for judgment as amatter of law on the same ground, upon a jury verdict finding him 100% at fault in the happeningof the accident, upon a jury verdict on the issue of damages awarding the plaintiff the principalsum of $175,000, and upon the denial of his motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside thejury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law or to set aside the jury verdict as contrary to theweight of the evidence, is in favor of the plaintiff and against him in the total sum of$187,288.75.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
" 'To be entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401, a defendant has theburden of showing that there is no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of theplaintiff and against the moving defendant' " (Delaney v Delaney, 83 AD3d 647, 648 [2011], quoting Velez v Goldenberg, 29 AD3d780, 781 [2006]). " 'In considering the motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial courtmust afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawn fromthe facts presented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant' "(Delaney v Delaney, 83 AD3d at 648, quoting Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553,556 [1997]). Contrary to the defendant Moussa Zlita's contention, viewing the facts in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiff, there was a rational process by which the jury could find that theplaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).
Zlita's challenge to the Supreme Court's denial of that branch of his motion pursuant toCPLR 4404 (a) which was to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law is alsowithout merit, as there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead[*2]rational people to the conclusion reached by the jury on thebasis of the evidence presented at trial (see Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499[1978]).
"A jury verdict should not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence unless theverdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence" (Rosenfeld v Baker, 78 AD3d 810,811 [2010]; see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744 [1995]). " 'Where, as here,conflicting expert testimony is presented, the jury is entitled to accept one expert's opinion, andreject that of another expert' " (Moralesv Interfaith Med. Ctr., 71 AD3d 648, 650 [2010], quoting Ross v Mandeville, 45 AD3d 755,757 [2007]). "When a verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, thesuccessful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view" (Handwerker v Dominick L. Cervi, Inc.,57 AD3d 615, 616 [2008]; seeTapia v Dattco, Inc., 32 AD3d 842, 842 [2006]). Here, a fair interpretation of theevidence supports the jury's conclusion that, based on the evidence before it, the plaintiffsustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of thesubject motor vehicle accident. Dickerson, J.P., Hall, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.