| Terminello v Village of Piermont |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 00953 [92 AD3d 673] |
| February 7, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Louis A. Terminello et al.,Respondents-Appellants, v Village of Piermont, Appellant-Respondent, et al.,Defendants. |
—[*1] Feerick Lynch MacCartney PLLC, South Nyack, N.Y. (Mary E. Marzolla of counsel), forrespondents-appellants.
In an action, inter alia, in effect, for a judgment declaring that Real Property Tax Law article19, as applied by Local Law No. 7 (2005) of the Village of Piermont, is unconstitutional, thedefendant Village of Piermont appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Rockland County (Weiner, J.), entered September 30, 2010, as denied itsconverted motion for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaint insofar as assertedagainst it and declaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied by Local Law No. 7(2005) of the Village of Piermont, is not unconstitutional, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal, aslimited by their notice of appeal and brief, from so much of the same order as denied that branchof their cross motion which was for summary judgment, in effect, on the issue of liability.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, the converted motionof the defendant Village of Piermont for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaintinsofar as asserted against it and declaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied byLocal Law No. 7 (2005) of the Village of Piermont, is not unconstitutional is granted, and thematter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Rockland County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia,declaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied by Local Law No. 7 (2005) of theVillage of Piermont, is not unconstitutional; and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant Village of Piermont.
On November 22, 2005, the Village of Piermont adopted Local Law No. 7 (2005) of theVillage of Piermont (hereinafter Local Law No. 7), "to adopt the provisions of Real Property TaxLaw, Section 1903 concerning Homestead base proportions." On the same date, the Villageadopted revaluation figures following a complete reassessment of real property within theVillage. The plaintiffs are residential condominium owners and homeowner's associations withinthe Village who [*2]allege, among other things, that their taxassessments increased disproportionately to other similarly situated properties after the Village'sadoption of Local Law No. 7 and the 2005 revaluation figures, and that such disparate treatmentis unconstitutional.
The Village established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law withregard to the plaintiffs' allegations that their federal and state constitutional rights to equalprotection were violated by the Village's adoption of Local Law No. 7 and the homesteadprovisions of the Real Property Tax Law. Legislative enactments and local laws arepresumptively valid (see Matter of Van Berkel v Power, 16 NY2d 37, 40 [1965]; Korotun v Incorporated Vil. ofBayville, 26 AD3d 311, 312-313 [2006]). This presumption is especially strong in thearea of taxation, where special deference is given to legislative policy choices (see 41 KewGardens Rd. Assoc. v Tyburski, 70 NY2d 325, 333 [1987]).
Furthermore, where, as here, the challenged legislation does not involve a suspect class orinterfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, the scope of judicial review is limited towhether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective (seeMaresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250 [1984]; Tilles Inv. Co. v Gulotta, 288 AD2d303, 304 [2001]). As the rational basis standard of review is especially deferential in the area oftax law, equal protection does not prevent the Legislature from treating one class of individualsor entities differently unless the difference is palpably arbitrary or amounts to invidiousdiscrimination (see Trump v Chu, 65 NY2d 20, 25 [1985]; Tilles Inv. Co. vGulotta, 288 AD2d at 305). Thus, a classification must be upheld if there is any reasonablyconceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification (see PortJefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 290 [1999], cert denied 530US 1276 [2000]).
Real Property Tax Law § 1901 (13) (a) defines the "Homestead class" to includecondominiums, but not any condominium which "previously was on an assessment roll as adwelling unit in other than condominium form of ownership" (RPTL 1901 [13] [a] [2]). TheVillage established, prima facie, that this provision bears a rational relationship to a valid stateinterest. Prohibiting retroactive application of the law is a valid state interest (see Matter of470 Newport Assoc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 211 AD2d 322, 326 [1995]).Furthermore, the classification of properties as homestead or non-homestead, and the impositionof different tax rates on each, is reasonable (see Foss v City of Rochester, 65 NY2d 247,257 [1985]).
In response to the Village's showing, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as towhether the application of the law to their properties violates their federal or state constitutionalrights to equal protection (see Matter of Chasalow v Board of Assessors of County ofNassau, 202 AD2d 499, 501 [1994]; Matter of Towne House Vil. Condominium vAssessor of Town of Islip, 200 AD2d 749 [1994]; cf. Foss v City of Rochester, 65NY2d at 260; Verga v Town of Clarkstown, 137 AD2d 809 [1988]). Accordingly, theVillage was entitled to summary judgment with respect to so much of the complaint, insofar asasserted against it, as alleged equal protection violations.
Contrary to the Village's contention, the plaintiffs did not abandon their remaining theories ofliability, which were argued both before the Supreme Court and on this appeal. Nevertheless, theVillage established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to theplaintiffs' allegations of federal and state due process violations (see A. Magnano Co. vHamilton, 292 US 40, 44 [1934]; Kaluczky v City of White Plains, 57 F3d 202, 211[1995]), and their allegation that the Village retaliated against them for exercising their federaland state free speech rights to file tax grievances (see Cobb v Pozzi, 363 F3d 89, 102[2004]). In response, the plaintiffs offered only conclusory allegations which failed to raise atriable issue of fact. Further, the plaintiffs' allegation of a conspiracy to violate their equalprotection and due process rights (see 42 USC § 1985 [3]; Carpenters vScott, 463 US 825, 829 [1983]), must also fail.
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the Village's converted motion forsummary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it anddeclaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied by Local Law No. 7, is notunconstitutional.[*3]
Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, thematter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Rockland County, for the entry of a judgment,inter alia, declaring that Real Property Tax Law article 19, as applied by Local Law No. 7, is notunconstitutional (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appeal dismissed371 US 74 [1962], cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]). Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Romanand Sgroi, JJ., concur.