Torres v Posy
2012 NY Slip Op 00954 [92 AD3d 676]
February 7, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 28, 2012


Adelis Torres, Respondent,
v
Marilyn S. Posy et al.,Appellants.

—[*1]Rivkin Radler, LLP, Uniondale, N.Y. (Evan H. Krinick, Cheryl F. Korman, Harris J.Zakarin, and Melissa M. Murphy of counsel), for appellants.

Gary J. Mandel, Far Rockaway, N.Y. (Shawn J. Wallach of counsel), forrespondent.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal froman order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Pineda-Kirwan, J.), dated May 13, 2011, whichdenied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that theplaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain aserious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subjectaccident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy vEyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). Although the plaintiff alleged that she sustainedcertain injuries to her right knee as a result of the subject accident, the defendants submittedcompetent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that those alleged injuries did notconstitute a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614[2009]), and, in any event, were not caused by the subject accident (see Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786,787 [2011]). In addition, although the plaintiff alleged that she sustained a serious injury underthe 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident, thedefendants submitted evidence establishing, prima facie, that she did not sustain such an injury(see McIntosh v O'Brien, 69 AD3d585, 587 [2010]).

In opposition, the plaintiff, who failed to adequately explain a cessation of her medicaltreatment (see Pommells v Perez, 4NY3d 566, 574 [2005]; Vasquez vJohn Doe #1, 73 AD3d 1033, 1034 [2010]), failed to raise a triable issue of fact (seePommells v Perez, 4 NY3d at 579). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted thedefendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Belenand Austin, JJ., concur.


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