Matter of Gardner v Coxsackie-Athens Cent. School Dist. Bd. ofEduc.
2012 NY Slip Op 01156 [92 AD3d 1093]
February 16, 2012
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 28, 2012


In the Matter of A. Dennis Gardner, Petitioner, v Coxsackie-AthensCentral School District Board of Education, Respondent.

—[*1]Richard E. Casagrande, Latham (Paul D. Clayton of counsel), for petitioner.

Tabner, Ryan & Keniry, L.L.P., Albany (Brian M. Quinn of counsel), forrespondent.

Spain, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by an order of theSupreme Court, entered in Greene County) to review a determination of respondent whichterminated petitioner's employment.

In 2009, following a Civil Service Law § 75 hearing, petitioner was found to haveengaged in inappropriate behavior in the form of his angry, profane and violent response tostudents engaging in an authorized senior prank, and respondent dismissed him from his positionas head custodian of the Coxsackie-Athens High School. Petitioner then commenced thisproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review respondent's determination. Supreme Courtdenied respondent's subsequent motion to dismiss the petition as untimely and transferred thecase to this Court. Because respondent made no written designation of the Hearing Officer whopresided over petitioner's hearing as required by Civil Service Law § 75 (2), the HearingOfficer had no jurisdiction and we are constrained to annul the determination.

Initially, we agree with Supreme Court that the four-month statute of limitations tocommence this CPLR article 78 proceeding was extended for 30 days upon filing a notice of[*2]claim under Education Law § 3813 (1) and, therefore,the instant petition was timely (see Matter of Brown v Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga Bd. ofCoop. Educ. Servs., 5 AD3d 939, 940 [2004]). In light of the clear language of the EducationLaw staying the limitations period under these circumstances, respondent's policy arguments thatthe stay should not apply in this case reflect arguments more properly advanced to theLegislature.

Civil Service Law § 75 (2) mandates that an employee disciplinary proceeding "shallbe held by the officer or body having the power to remove the person against whom such chargesare preferred, or by a . . . person designated by such officer or body in writing"(Civil Service Law § 75 [2]; accord Matter of Gomez v Stout, 13 NY3d 182, 186 [2009]; see Matter of Perryman v Village ofSaranac Lake, 64 AD3d 830, 832 [2009]). In the absence of a written designation, theremoving body or hearing officer has no jurisdiction to discipline an employee and anydisposition flowing from such a proceeding will be void (see Matter of Wiggins v Board ofEduc. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 385, 387-388 [1983]; Matter of Perez v New York StateDept. of Labor, 244 AD2d 844, 844-845 [1997]).

Here, respondent has provided no evidence that it ever designated the Hearing Officer inwriting as required by Civil Service Law § 75 (2) (compare Matter of Perryman vVillage of Saranac Lake, 64 AD3d at 832-833 [designation of hearing officer reflected inminutes of board meeting]; Matter ofStafford v Board of Educ. of Mohonasen Cent. School Dist., 61 AD3d 1259, 1259-1260[2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 704 [2009] [designation of hearing officer memorialized inletter referencing appointment of hearing officer at board meeting]). Although respondent arguesthat petitioner had notice of the Hearing Officer's identity because its attorney copied petitioneron an e-mail to the Hearing Officer establishing the time and date of the hearing, suchcorrespondence does not reference any official designation of the Hearing Officer by respondentand, as such, is insufficient to meet the specific requirement of Civil Service Law § 75 (2)(see Matter of Perez v New York State Dept. of Labor, 244 AD2d at 844-845). Inaddition, this jurisdictional defect could not be waived by petitioner's failure to object (seeid. at 845; Matter of Blount v Forbes, 250 App Div 15, 18 [1937]). Accordingly, theHearing Officer's determination and respondent's adoption thereof must be annulled andpetitioner restored to his former position, with back pay and benefits (see Matter of Wiggins vBoard of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d at 387-388; Matter of Perez v New York StateDept. of Labor, 244 AD2d at 845).

Mercure, A.P.J., Kavanagh, Stein and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determinationis annulled, without costs, and petition granted to the extent that petitioner is restored to hisformer position with back pay and benefits.


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