| Matter of King v Edwards |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01255 [92 AD3d 783] |
| February 14, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Lionel King, Respondent, v KeithEdwards, Appellant. |
—[*1] Virginia Geiss, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Keith Edwards appealsfrom (1) an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Cammer,J.H.O.), dated March 16, 2011, which, after a hearing, found that he had committed the familyoffense of harassment in the second degree and directed him to comply with the conditions setforth in an order of protection of the same court dated March 16, 2011, for a period not to exceedthree months, and (2) the order of protection dated March 16, 2011, which, inter alia, directedhim to refrain from assaulting, stalking, or harassing the petitioner for a period up to andincluding June 16, 2011.
Ordered that the appeal from the order of protection, and the appeal from so much of theorder of fact-finding and disposition as directed the appellant to observe the conditions set forthin the order of protection for a period not to exceed three months, are dismissed as academic,without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, withoutcosts or disbursements.
The appeal from the order of protection, and the appeal from so much of the order offact-finding and disposition as directed the appellant to observe the conditions set forth in theorder of protection for a period not to exceed three months, have been rendered academic by thepassing of the time limits contained therein (see Matter of Bibolova v Radu, 82 AD3d 1222, 1222-1223 [2011];Matter of Zieran v Marvin, 2 AD3d870, 871-872 [2003]). Nevertheless, even though the order of protection has expired, "inlight of the enduring consequences which may flow from an adjudication that a party hascommitted a family offense," the appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding anddisposition as made that adjudication is not academic (Matter of Pastore v Russo, 38 AD3d 556, 556 [2007]; seeMatter of Bibolova v Radu, 82 AD3d at 1223; Matter of Rochester v Rochester, 26 AD3d 387 [2006]).
The Family Court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding, as theevidence in the record clearly established that the alleged family offense occurred in Brooklyn,[*2]and, in any event, a Family Court's subject matter jurisdictionover a family offense is not limited by geography (see Matter of Richardson v Richardson, 80 AD3d 32, 41-42[2010]).
The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to beresolved by the Family Court, and that court's determination regarding the credibility ofwitnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the record (see Matter of Creighton v Whitmore,71 AD3d 1141 [2010]). Here, a fair preponderance of the credible evidence adduced at thefact-finding hearing supported a finding that the appellant committed the family offense ofharassment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 240.26 [3]; Matter of Clarke v Clarke, 8 AD3d375 [2004]; Matter of DeNobile v Tenaglia, 299 AD2d 409 [2002]). Dillon, J.P.,Leventhal, Belen and Lott, JJ., concur.