| People v Taylor |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01341 [92 AD3d 556] |
| February 21, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Harold Taylor, Appellant. |
—[*1] Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Timothy C. Stone of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J.), rendered December 16,2008, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, and sentencing himto a term of 23 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The court was not obligated, sua sponte, to order a CPL article 730 examination (see Patev Robinson, 383 US 375 [1966]; People v Tortorici, 92 NY2d 757 [1999], certdenied 528 US 834 [1999]; People v Morgan, 87 NY2d 878 [1995]). Although, attimes, defendant engaged in obnoxious behavior and made outrageous statements, he did notmanifest an inability to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense. Defendant wasgenerally lucid and took an active role in his defense (see e.g. People v Mendez, 306AD2d 143 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 622 [2003]). Furthermore, the court ordered apsychiatric examination in aid of sentencing. Although this was not an article 730 competencyexamination, the psychiatrist's report did not raise any doubts about defendant's competency.
The court conducted a sufficient inquiry into defendant's motion for assignment of substitutecounsel and the assigned counsel's motion to be relieved. Although a more detailed inquirywould have been the best practice, the court accorded both defendant and his counsel a suitableopportunity to address the issue, and properly concluded that there was no good cause for asubstitution. A defendant's "unjustified hostility toward his counsel" does not requiresubstitution, nor does an "artificial conflict" created by a defendant who files meritlesscomplaints against counsel (People vWalton, 14 AD3d 419, 420 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 796 [2005]).
The court properly declined to charge justification since there was no reasonable view of theevidence, when viewed most favorably to defendant, to support that defense (see People vGoetz, 68 NY2d 96, 105-106 [1986]; People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299, 301 [1982]).Defendant asked for a charge on the use of deadly force to prevent the commission of a robbery(see Penal Law § 35.15 [2] [b]). In the first place, the evidence established that theunarmed deceased attempted, at most, to commit a nonforcible larceny. In any event, at the timedefendant stabbed the deceased 16 times, the deceased had been knocked to the ground andposed no immediate threat.[*2]
After a proper inquiry, the court properly exercised itsdiscretion in denying defendant's request to replace a sworn juror who had a conversation abouther jury service with a colleague who was a former assistant district attorney. The court properlydetermined that the juror, who gave unequivocal assurances of her impartiality, was fit tocontinue serving and to render a fair verdict. The juror did not have a relationship with theprosecution that would create an implied bias (see People v Furey, 18 NY3d 284 [2011]). Since the juror did notdiscuss anything about the facts of the case with her colleague, there was no misconduct seriousenough to require disqualification (see e.g. People v Gordon, 11 AD3d 342 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d744 [2004]). Concur—Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Acosta, Freedman and Richter, JJ.