| People v Rodriguez |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01361 [92 AD3d 586] |
| February 23, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v ReyesRodriguez, Appellant. |
—[*1] Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Christopher P. Marinelli of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie G. Wittner, J.), rendered December19, 2007, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy inthe second and fourth degrees, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of 12 years, 6 to 18 years,and 1
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of theevidence (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibilitydeterminations.
There was sufficient nonaccomplice testimony to satisfy the accomplice corroborationrequirement (see CPL 60.22 [1]; People v Morales, 86 AD3d 147, 162 [2011], lv denied 17NY3d 904 [2011]). Nonaccomplice witnesses provided many corroborating details including, butnot limited to, the description of a vehicle that matched the description of defendant's vehicle.
Defendant did not preserve his claim that a portion of a nontestifying, jointly triedcodefendant's remark, made to one of the accomplice witnesses, implicated defendant andthereby violated his right of confrontation. Under the circumstances, merely requesting certainremedies associated with Bruton v United States (391 US 123 [1968]) did not suffice topreserve a Confrontation Clause claim, particularly because the court was not alerted to the issueof whether the remark in question was testimonial. We decline to review this claim in the interestof justice.
As an alternative holding, we find no Confrontation Clause violation. The codefendant'sremark to the accomplice witness cannot be viewed as testimonial (see People v Rodriguez, 47 AD3d406, 407-408 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 770 [2008]). Accordingly, the remark wasbeyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause (see e.g. United States vFigueroa-Cartagena, 612 F3d 69, 85 [1st Cir 2010]). Furthermore, the remark in questionwas not received for its truth, and it did not facially implicate defendant.
Defendant objected, under Crawford v Washington (541 US 36 [2004]), to anofficer's testimony about how he learned defendant's nickname. However, this testimony did notviolate Crawford, because the officer did not directly place before the jury anytestimonial statement by a nontestifying declarant, and this portion of the officer's testimony wasnot offered for its truth. [*2]In any event, were we to find anyerror, we would find it to be harmless.
Defendant's Confrontation Clause argument concerning the testimony of an expert witness isunpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, wealso reject it on the merits, and also find any error to be harmless in any event.
We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining claims. Concur—Mazzarelli,J.P., Catterson, Renwick, Abdus-Salaam and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.