| Arbuzova v Skalet |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01418 [92 AD3d 816] |
| February 21, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Lilia Arbuzova, Respondent, v Yury Skalet et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Steven B. Sarshik, New York, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action to recover on a promissory note, the defendants appeal from a judgment of theSupreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), entered March 28, 2011, which, upon an order ofthe same court dated February 17, 2011, granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment onthe complaint and denying their cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, isin favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principal sum of $125,000.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
A corporation is prohibited from asserting the defense of civil usury (see GeneralObligations Law § 5-521; Schneider v Phelps, 41 NY2d 238, 242 [1977];Tower Funding v Berry Realty, 302 AD2d 513, 514 [2003]). An individual guarantor of acorporate obligation is also precluded from raising such a defense (see Schneider vPhelps, 41 NY2d at 242; Tower Funding v Berry Realty, 302 AD2d at 514). Here,although the interest rate in the subject promissory note exceeded 16% per annum (seeGeneral Obligations Law § 5-501 [1], [2]; Banking Law § 14-a [1]; TowerFunding v Berry Realty, 302 AD2d at 514), the plaintiff established, prima facie, that theloan was made to the corporate defendant, Bais Seller Realty, with the defendant Yury Skalet aspersonal guarantor of the loan (see Tower Funding v Berry Realty, 302 AD2d at 514). Inopposition to this prima facie showing, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact(see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summaryjudgment on her complaint and denied the defendants' cross motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.P., Florio, Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.