| Matter of Donovan E. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01459 [92 AD3d 881] |
| February 21, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Donovan E., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Larry A. Sonnenshein ofcounsel; Kathy H. Chang on the brief), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Donovan E.appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Turbow, J.), datedMarch 22, 2011, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated August 12, 2010, madeupon his admission, finding that he had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, wouldhave constituted the crime of sexual misconduct, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent andconditionally discharged him for a period of 12 months. The appeal from the order of dispositionbrings up for review the fact-finding order.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretionin adjudicating him a juvenile delinquent and directing a 12-month period of conditionaldischarge instead of ordering an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (see FamilyCt Act §§ 315.3, 352.1, 352.2). The Family Court has broad discretion in fashioningorders of disposition (see Matter ofTafari M., 90 AD3d 1052 [2011]; Matter of Anthony G., 82 AD3d 1235 [2011]), and itsdetermination is accorded great deference (see Matter of Leonard J., 67 AD3d 911, 912 [2009]; Matter of Michael D., 60 AD3d945 [2009]). The record reveals that the Family Court gave careful consideration to whetherthe placement of the appellant on conditional discharge was the least restrictive alternativeconsistent with his best interests and the need for protection of the community (seeFamily Ct Act § 352.2 [2] [a]). The disposition reflects a provident exercise of discretionunder the circumstances of this case, including the seriousness of the offense, therecommendation of the New York City Department of Probation, and evidence indicating theappellant's continuing need for court-supervised therapy and treatment (see Matter of TafariM., 90 AD3d at 1052; Matter ofBryant M., 82 AD3d 509, 510 [2011]; Matter of Jonathan F., 72 AD3d 963, 964 [2010]). Rivera, J.P.,Angiolillo, Leventhal and Cohen, JJ., concur.